* Per 2a3e82fa96, it looks like some Windows 7 system have trouble with
LoadLibraryEx() if they don't have KB2533623 installed (which fixes a MAJOR Windows
vulnerability. Some people sure want to leave their system open to hackers...).
* Work around this by adding a fallback to LoadLibrary() in GetLibraryHandle()
* Also switch to using GetLibraryHandle() in dos.c and using LoadLibrary() in sections
where we have the full path (since these calls are not vulnerable).
* This basically means that the script is validate *TWICE*, using two
completely independent signatures, before it is allowed to run, which
should add another mitigation layer against TOCTOU (which we already
friggin' mitigated against anyway) and other potential vectors of
attack.
* Also remove -DisableFirstRunCustomize option and the associated cookie
prompt monitoring, which the latest version of Fido no longer requires.
* Also update WDK version for signtool and flesh out PKI error messages.
* Closes#1467
* Also ensure that previous element is set when repositioning a
control to preserve tabbing order
* Also fix x64 version being able to download x86 BETA
* Also disable Launch button while we do so
* Also add new <Ctrl>-<Alt>-<Y> cheat mode
* Also terminate update thread before exiting if running
* Also set version to rufus-next
* Since we have compression available through Bled we might as well use it
* Also validate that the download URL comes from https://github.com/pbatard/Fido
* Also prevent the check for update from running while we are downloading ISOs
* Also fix an issue where Rufus doesn't report an error if 'fmifs.dll' can't be found (#1284)
* Also improve GitHub issue template to mention that Ctrl-L can also be used to access the log
* Center dialog on open
* Close dialog on main application exit
* Display ISO short name & size on status bar during download
* Display ISO download progress on taskbar
* Also fix improper detection of EAGET Mass Storage USB Device as HDD
* This is accomplished through Fido (https://github.com/pbatard/Fido), a *SIGNED*
PowerShell script, that is downloaded from GitHub and that resides in memory for
the duration of a session.
* The reason we use a downloaded PS script, rather than an embedded on, is because:
- Microsoft have regularly been changing the deal with regards to how retail ISOs
can be downloaded, and not for the better, so we can't simply embed a static
means of downloading ISOs and expect that to work forever.
- By using an external script, we can immediately respond to whatever new means of
*ANNOYING* their legitimate users Microsoft will come up with next, as well as
make sure that, the minute a new retail version of Windows becomes available, it
also becomes available for download in Rufus.
* Note that if you are concerned about downloading a remote PS script that is being
run at the same level as an elevated application, you should understand that:
- Only scripts downloaded from GitHub, from an account that is protected with 2FA,
are allowed to run (i.e. someone would first have to steal a *physical* 2FA key
to be in a position to upload a malicious script).
- On top of this, only scripts that are signed with a separate private key (RSA +
AES-256), that is itself also protected with a strong unique password which only
a single person knows (and must manually enter each time they want to make a new
version of the script available for download), are allowed to run.
The above means that there's about as much chance for someone to manage to upload
a malicious script on the GitHub servers, that Rufus would allow to run, as there
is for someone to upload a malicious version of Rufus itself.
Still, if you are paranoid and have concerns that, even as you can validate from
its source that Rufus does not attempt to execute any remote script unless a user
actively selected and clicked the DOWNLOAD button, you can also completely disable
the remote script download feature, if you just set the update check to disabled
(which, by the way, Rufus *EXPLICITLY* asks you to choose whether you want to
enable or not, the very first time you run the application).
* Also remove _unlinkU() which duplicates what DeleteFileU() already does.
* Some Thai UTF-8 notification messages went over the buffer size limit we used for vsnprintf()
* Also, revert part of 645184f11e and use LRE+PDF marks instead:
Don't handle in the code what is better handled in the loc file.
* We now auto resize the height of the Notification dialog according to the
number of lines of the message.
* Also harmonize local RECT variable names according to what we do elsewhere.
With thanks to Itiel
* Fix a potential buffer overflow in lmprintf for RTL languages
* Automatically apply RLE/PDF to all RTL messages, and remove the RLE/PDFs from the .loc
* Fix Windows messing up of multiline RTL tooltips (The trick is, if you want actually
want RTL, you need to *disable* RTL... Sure, Microsoft, that makes a lot of sense?!?)
* Also properly scale the length of the multiline tooltips according to the zoom factor
* Closes#1132
* Whole screen was being refreshed when calling InvalidateRect() in ResizeMoveCtrl()
* Progress bar bounding rectangle could be erased at 0.0%
* No progress was displayed when writing ISOHybrid images in DD mode
* Also fix an issue when write error would not display the error string
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes#1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
* Rufus now checks for processes with handles opened on the drives/volumes before
starting the format operation and asks the user if they want to continue.
* This mimics Windows' behaviour when formatting drives, and actually uses the
same message as the one from shell32.dll.mui.
* Closes#773
