* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes#1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
* Introduced in 369a392af0 because, of course when Microsoft has a
call that goes (###, param1, param2) they define a macro for it that goes (param2, param1)...
* Required to support Debian Live 9.1 in ISO mode
* Note that this only works if the efi.img boot files do not require
additional content besides the one extracted from the ISO.
* Don't duplicate the PrintInfo() from DownloadFile()
* Make sure caret is disabled and displayed text will not appear selected
* Also update MSG_085 and remove unneeded MSG_240
* Add a WaitForSingleObjectWithMessages() call so that we can process Windows messages
while waiting on events (prevents lockup while issuing log messages)
* Limit the total duration of CheckDriveAccess() to 2 seconds
* Allow for user cancellation
* Also update code to use the Edit_####() predefined macros for Edit controls instead of EM_### messages
* The process search appears to be blocking on some platform, and we
also don't want users to have to wait too long on format startup
* Also update the update check for Windows XP SSL errors
