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allow tor circuits to take longer to be detected as tls
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30e65aa91d
commit
afaa9af5f4
1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -4016,9 +4016,12 @@ new_player ( object_t *ob, SOCKET_T new_socket
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# ifdef HAS_PSYC
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# ifdef HAS_PSYC
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/* give TLS 4 seconds to start. in fact even 1 second should
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/* give TLS 4 seconds to start. in fact even 1 second should
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* be enough as the TLS init packet is sent immediately with
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* be enough as the TLS init packet is sent immediately with
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* the TCP 3-way handshake completion.
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* the TCP 3-way handshake completion. Is it different for
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* Tor? When connections are coming from a Tor exit node
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* they may need more than 4 seconds to fire up TLS. We
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* should discontinue unencrypted protocols entirely...
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*/
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*/
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new_interactive->tls_autodetect = ob == NULL? 4 : 0;
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new_interactive->tls_autodetect = ob == NULL? 9 : 0;
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# endif
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# endif
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new_interactive->tls_want_peer_cert = MY_FALSE;
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new_interactive->tls_want_peer_cert = MY_FALSE;
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#endif
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#endif
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