mirror of
git://git.psyced.org/git/psyced
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299 lines
8.6 KiB
C
299 lines
8.6 KiB
C
// vim:foldmethod=marker:syntax=lpc:noexpandtab
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// $Id: circuit.c,v 1.38 2008/10/14 19:02:29 lynx Exp $
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#include "psyc.h"
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#include <net.h>
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#include <url.h>
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#include <tls.h>
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#include <text.h>
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inherit NET_PATH "trust";
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inherit NET_PATH "spyc/parse";
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virtual inherit NET_PATH "output";
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volatile string peerhost;
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volatile string peeraddr;
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volatile string peerip;
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volatile int peerport;
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volatile string netloc;
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#ifndef NEW_RENDER
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# define NEW_RENDER
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#endif
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#include "edit.i"
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// this is completely anti-psyc. it should take mcs as arguments
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// and look up the actual message from textdb.. FIXME
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#define CIRCUITERROR(reason) { debug_message("PSYC CIRCUIT ERROR: " reason); \
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croak("_error_circuit", "circuit error: " \
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reason); \
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return 0; \
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}
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mapping instate;
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mapping outstate;
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mapping legal_senders;
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volatile int flags = 0;
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void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data); // prototype
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varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data,
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mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target); // prototype
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protected void quit(); // prototype
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void runQ();
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int isServer() { return 0; }
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void feed(string data) {
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input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG);
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::feed(data);
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}
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// yes, this is a funny implementation of croak
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// it does not use msg(). Yes, that is intended
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varargs mixed croak(string mc, string data, vamapping vars, vamixed source) {
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binary_message(sprintf("\n%s\n%s\n|\n", mc, data));
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remove_interactive(ME);
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destruct(ME);
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return 0;
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}
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// gets called during socket logon
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int logon(int failure) {
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sAuthHosts(([ ])); // reset authhosts
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legal_senders = ([ ]);
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instate = ([ "_INTERNAL_origin" : ME]);
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outstate = ([ ]);
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#ifdef __TLS__
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mixed cert;
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if (tls_available() && tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 1 && mappingp(cert = tls_certificate(ME, 0))) {
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mixed m, t;
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if (cert[0] != 0) {
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// log error 17 + cert here
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// and goodbye.
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P0(("%O encountered a cert verify error %O in %O\n", ME,
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cert[0], cert))
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remove_interactive(ME);
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return 0;
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}
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if (m = cert["2.5.29.17:dNSName"]) {
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// FIXME: this does not yet handle wildcard DNS names
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P1(("%O believing dNSName %O\n", ME, m))
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// probably also: register_target?
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// but be careful never to register_target wildcards
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if (stringp(m))
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sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(m));
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else
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foreach(t : m)
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sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
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}
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//#ifdef _flag_allow_certificate_name_common // to be switched this year
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#ifndef _flag_disallow_certificate_name_common
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// assume that CN is a host
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// as this is an assumption only, we may NEVER register_target it
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// note: CN is deprecated for good reasons.
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else if (t = cert["2.5.4.3"]) {
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P1(("%O believing CN %O\n", ME, t))
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sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
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}
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#endif
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if (m = tls_query_connection_info(ME)) {
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P2(("%O is using the %O cipher.\n", ME, m[TLS_CIPHER]))
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// shouldn't our negotiation have ensured we have PFS?
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if (stringp(t = m[TLS_CIPHER]) &&! abbrev("DHE", t)) {
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// croak("_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher",
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// "Your cipher choice does not provide forward secrecy.");
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monitor_report(
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"_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher_details",
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object_name(ME) +" · using "+ t +" cipher");
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//debug_message(sprintf(
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// "TLS connection info for %O is %O\n", ME, m));
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//QUIT // are we ready for *this* !???
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}
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}
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}
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#endif
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peerip = query_ip_number(ME) || "127.0.0.1";
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#if __EFUN_DEFINED__(enable_binary)
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enable_binary(ME);
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#else
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# echo Driver compiled without enable_binary() - PSYC functionality warning!
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#endif
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input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG);
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call_out(#'quit, 90);
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flags = TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
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parser_init();
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// FIXME
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unless(isServer()) {
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emit("|\n"); // initial greeting
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msg(0, "_request_features", 0);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int disconnected(string remaining) {
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// i love to copy+paste source codes! thx for NOT sharing.. grrr
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#if DEBUG > 0
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if (remaining && (!stringp(remaining) || strlen(remaining)))
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PP(("%O ignoring remaining data from socket: %O\n", ME,
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remaining));
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#endif
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// wow.. a sincerely expected disconnect!
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if (flags & TCP_PENDING_DISCONNECT) return 1;
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monitor_report("_failure_network_circuit_disconnect",
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object_name(ME) +" · lost PSYC circuit");
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return 0; // unexpected
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}
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// respond to the first empty packet
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first_response() {
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emit("|\n");
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}
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// processes routing header variable assignments
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// basic version does no state
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mapping process_header(mixed varops) {
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mapping vars = ([ ]);
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foreach(mixed vop : varops) {
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string vname = vop[0];
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switch(vop[1]) {
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case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_ASSIGN:
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instate[vname] = vop[2];
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// fall thru
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case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_SET:
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vars[vname] = vop[2];
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break;
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case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_AUGMENT:
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case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_DIMINISH:
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case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_QUERY:
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CIRCUITERROR("header modifier with glyph other than ':', this is not implemented")
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break;
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default:
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CIRCUITERROR("header modifier with unknown glyph")
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break;
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}
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// FIXME: not every legal varname is a mmp varname
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// look at shared_memory("routing")
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if (!legal_keyword(vname) || abbrev("_INTERNAL", vname)) {
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CIRCUITERROR("illegal varname in header")
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}
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}
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return vars;
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}
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#define PSYC_TCP
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#include "dispatch.i"
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// request sender authentication and/or target acknowledgement
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// from the remote side
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void sender_verification(array(string) sourcehosts, array(string) targethosts)
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{
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// FIXME: wrong variables here
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mapping vars = ([ "_list_sources_hosts" : sourcehosts,
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"_list_targets_hosts" : targethosts,
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"_tag" : RANDHEXSTRING ]);
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// assumption: we have already resolved all targethosts and
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// they point to the remote ip
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foreach(string ho : targethosts) {
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sAuthenticated(ho);
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}
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msg(0, "_request_verification", 0, vars);
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}
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// receives a msg from the remote side
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// note: this is circuit-messaging
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void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data) {
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switch(mc) {
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case "_request_verification":
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if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) {
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array(string) targethosts = ({ });
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foreach(string ho : vars["_list_targets_hosts"]) {
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if (is_localhost(ho)) {
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targethosts += ({ ho });
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}
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}
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if (sizeof(vars["_list_sources_hosts"]) == 1) {
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// doing multiple resolutions in parallel is more complicated
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string ho = vars["_list_sources_hosts"][0];
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if (qAuthenticated(ho)) {
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P0(("warning: trying to reverify authenticated host %O",ho))
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} else {
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dns_resolve(ho, (:
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// FIXME: psyc/parse::deliver is much better here
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mixed rv = (["_list_targets_accepted_hosts":targethosts]);
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if (vars["_tag"]) rv["_tag_reply"] = vars["_tag"];
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if ($1 == peerip) {
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sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(ho));
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rv["_list_sources_verified_hosts"] = ({ ho });
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} else {
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rv["_list_sources_rejected_hosts"] = ({ ho });
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}
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msg(0, "_notice_verification", 0, rv);
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return;
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:));
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}
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} else {
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// FIXME!!!!
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CIRCUITERROR("sorry, no more than one element in _list_sources_hosts currently");
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}
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// keep tag if present!!!
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// resolve all of _list_sources_hosts
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// look at _list_targets_hosts and determine localhostiness
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} else {
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CIRCUITERROR("_request_verification is not allowed on TLS circuits.");
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// _request_verification is not allowed on tls circuits
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}
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break;
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case "_notice_features":
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// FIXME: watch for _list_using_modules
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if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
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P0(("removing call out\n"))
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remove_call_out(#'quit);
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flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
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}
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sTextPath();
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if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) {
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// start hostname verification
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// rather: look at Q and look for the hostnames we need
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sender_verification(({ SERVER_HOST }), ({ peerhost }));
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} else {
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if (function_exists("runQ")) {
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runQ();
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}
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}
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break;
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case "_notice_verification":
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P0(("_notice verification with %O\n", vars))
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if (function_exists("runQ")) {
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runQ();
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}
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break;
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default:
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P0(("%O got circuit_msg %O, not implemented\n", ME, mc))
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break;
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}
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}
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// delivers a message to the remote side
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varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data,
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mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target) {
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string buf = "";
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unless(vars) vars = ([ ]);
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buf = psyc_render(source, mc, data, vars, showingLog, target);
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#ifdef _flag_log_sockets_SPYC
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log_file("RAW_SPYC", "« %O\n%s\n", ME, buf);
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#endif
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return emit(buf);
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}
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