mirror of git://git.psyced.org/git/psyced
237 lines
6.9 KiB
C
237 lines
6.9 KiB
C
#include <net.h> // vim syntax=lpc
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#include <proto.h>
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#include <sys/tls.h>
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mapping tls_certificate(object who, int longnames) {
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mixed *extra, extensions;
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mapping cert;
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int i, j;
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cert = ([ ]);
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#if __EFUN_DEFINED__(tls_check_certificate)
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# ifdef WANT_S2S_SASL
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# ifdef __psyclpc__
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# if __EFUN_DEFINED__(enable_binary) // happens to be committed at the same time
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extra = tls_check_certificate(who, 2);
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# else
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extra = tls_check_certificate(who, 1);
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# endif
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# else
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extra = tls_check_certificate(who);
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# endif
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unless (extra && sizeof(extra) > 2) return 0;
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cert[0] = extra[0];
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if (sizeof(extra) >= 4)
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cert[1] = extra[3];
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extensions = extra[2];
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extra = extra[1];
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(extra); i += 3) {
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mixed t;
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t = cert[extra[i]];
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// THIS IS ALWAYS TRUE FOR DRIVER >= 3.3.712
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// OTHERWISE YOU SHOULD NOT ENABLE S2S SASL. PERIOD.
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if (sizeof(extra) > i+2) {
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unless (t) {
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cert[extra[i]] = extra[i+2];
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} else if (stringp(t)) {
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cert[extra[i]] = ({ t, extra[i+2] });
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} else if (pointerp(t)) {
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cert[extra[i]] += ({ extra[i+2] });
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} else {
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PT(("fippo says this should not happen but you know it always does! %O\n", ME))
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}
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} else {
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PT(("fippo says this should not happen(2) but you know it always does! %O\n", ME))
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}
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}
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if (longnames) {
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// set up short/long names
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(extra); i +=3) {
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cert[extra[i+1]] = cert[extra[i]];
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(extensions); i += 3) {
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string key, mkey;
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mixed *val;
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unless(extensions[i]) continue;
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key = extensions[i];
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val = extensions[i+2];
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for (j = 0; j < sizeof(val); j += 3) {
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mixed t;
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mkey = key + ":" + val[j];
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t = cert[mkey];
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unless (t) {
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cert[mkey] = val[j+2];
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} else if (stringp(t)) {
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cert[mkey] = ({ t, val[j+2] });
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} else if (pointerp(t)) {
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cert[mkey] += ({ val[j+2] });
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} else {
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// should not happen
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}
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}
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}
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# else
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# echo No WANT_S2S_SASL ? You even have the right driver for it!
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# endif
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#else
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# echo No tls_check_certificate available with this driver.
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#endif
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P2(("cert is %O\n", cert))
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return cert;
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}
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// generalized variant of the old certificate_check_jabbername
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// RFC 6125 describes the process in more detail
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int tls_check_service_identity(string name, mixed cert, string scheme) {
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mixed t;
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string idn;
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// FIXME: should probably be more careful about internationalized
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// domain names - need testcases
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#define WILDCARD_MATCH(thing) (strlen(thing) > 2 && thing[0] == '*' && thing[1] == '.' && trail(thing[2..], name))
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/* this does not support wildcards if there is more than one
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* id-on-xmppAddr/CN
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* API Note: name MUST be an utf8 string
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*/
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unless(name && cert && mappingp(cert)) return 0;
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name = NAMEPREP(name);
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// subjectAlternativeName - dNSName
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if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:dNSName"])) {
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if (stringp(t)) t = ({ t });
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foreach(string t2 : t) {
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t2 = NAMEPREP(t2);
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if (name == t2 || WILDCARD_MATCH(t2))
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return 1;
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}
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}
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// subjectAlternativeName - SRV ID - FIXME
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// unfortunately, the only ones I have encountered so far were ... unusable
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// what they should like is "_psyc.name" - i.e. "_" + scheme + "." + name
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// no wildcards probably
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if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"])) {
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P2(("encountered SRVName, please tell fippo: %O\n", t))
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}
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// URI ID - FIXME
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// not seen yet
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#if 0
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// id-on-xmppAddr - have not seen them issued by anyone but
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// startcom and those usually include dnsname, too
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// utf8-encoded
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if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"])) {
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if (pointerp(t)) {
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if (member(t, name) != -1) return 1;
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foreach(string cn : t) {
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if (NAMEPREP(cn) == name) return 1;
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}
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}
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else if (name == NAMEPREP(t))
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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// commonName - deprecated to put the host here but...
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// this is only to be checked if no subjectAlternativeName is present
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if (!cert["2.5.29.17"] && (t = cert["2.5.4.3"])) { // common name
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if (pointerp(t)) { // does that happen?! I don't think so...
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// fast way - works for traditional hostnames
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if (member(t, name) != -1) return 1;
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// look for idn encoded stuff
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foreach(string cn : t) {
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#ifdef __IDNA__
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idn = NAMEPREP(idna_to_unicode(cn));
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#else
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idn = NAMEPREP(cn);
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#endif
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if (idn == name) return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef __IDNA__
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idn = NAMEPREP(idna_to_unicode(t));
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#else
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idn = NAMEPREP(t);
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#endif
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if (idn == name || WILDCARD_MATCH(idn))
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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string tls_bad_cipher(object sock, string scheme) {
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// ignore if pidgin uses a bad cipher over an ssh tunnel
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if (scheme == "jabber" && is_localhost(query_ip_number(sock))) return 0;
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mixed t = tls_query_connection_info(sock);
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unless (t) return "NO-CIPHER"; // shouldnt happen
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t = t[TLS_CIPHER];
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P3(("%O is using the %O cipher.\n", sock, t))
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// shouldn't our negotiation have ensured we have PFS?
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if (stringp(t) &&! (abbrev("DHE", t) || abbrev("ECDHE", t))) {
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monitor_report("_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher_details",
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object_name(sock) +" · using "+ t +" cipher");
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return t;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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// This function handles safety via TLS, Tor and GNUnet. The
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// latter of the three is the distributed system you should
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// be using. --lynX 2016
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//
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// FIXME: move this function to a different library file...
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// "tls" is no longer appropriate
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//
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int probably_private(object source) {
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// object has no TCP to it. you have to ask its circuit.
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unless (objectp(source) && interactive(source))
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return PRIVACY_UNKNOWN;
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// should use trustworthy level 9 instead? if so.. how?
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if (query_ip_number(source) == "127.0.0.1"
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// query_ip_number() efun is faster than a local
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// LPC variable, so it is fine we call it often
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|| query_ip_number(source) == __HOST_IP_NUMBER__
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# ifdef SECURE_IP_NUMBER
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|| SECURE_IP_NUMBER(query_ip_number(source))
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# endif
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// People coming from localhost have either made it
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// through SSH's reasonable certificate pinning or
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// Tor's public-key based addressing.. both provide
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// reasonable protection from men in the middle, if
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// only the server itself could be considered secure.
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//
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) return PRIVACY_REASONABLE;
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//
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// Coming from GNUnet means that we are ourselves a
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// GNUnet node. This increases the chances that we
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// are a private individual's machine in a private
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// home rather than a server in a computing centre.
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// Let's guess that is good news.
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//
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if (IS_GNUNET(query_ip_number(source))) return PRIVACY_GOOD;
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//
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# if __EFUN_DEFINED__(tls_query_connection_state)
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// Alas, this person is using a TLS/SSL-enhanced
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// access protocol which, unless the client implements
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// certificate pinning, is susceptible to man in the
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// middle attacks. Find out more on this topic on
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// http://patrol.psyced.org
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//
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if (tls_query_connection_state(source))
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return PRIVACY_MITMX509;
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# endif
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return PRIVACY_SURVEILLED;
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}
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