// vim:foldmethod=marker:syntax=lpc:noexpandtab // $Id: circuit.c,v 1.38 2008/10/14 19:02:29 lynx Exp $ #include "psyc.h" #include #include #include #include inherit NET_PATH "trust"; inherit NET_PATH "spyc/parse"; virtual inherit NET_PATH "output"; volatile string peerhost; volatile string peeraddr; volatile string peerip; volatile int peerport; volatile string netloc; #ifndef NEW_RENDER # define NEW_RENDER #endif #include "edit.i" // this is completely anti-psyc. it should take mcs as arguments // and look up the actual message from textdb.. FIXME #define CIRCUITERROR(reason) { debug_message("PSYC CIRCUIT ERROR: " reason); \ croak("_error_circuit", "circuit error: " \ reason); \ return 0; \ } mapping instate; mapping outstate; mapping legal_senders; volatile int flags = 0; void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data); // prototype varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data, mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target); // prototype protected void quit(); // prototype void runQ(); int isServer() { return 0; } void feed(string data) { input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG); ::feed(data); } // yes, this is a funny implementation of croak // it does not use msg(). Yes, that is intended varargs mixed croak(string mc, string data, vamapping vars, vamixed source) { binary_message(sprintf("\n%s\n%s\n|\n", mc, data)); remove_interactive(ME); destruct(ME); return 0; } // gets called during socket logon int logon(int failure) { sAuthHosts(([ ])); // reset authhosts legal_senders = ([ ]); instate = ([ "_INTERNAL_origin" : ME]); outstate = ([ ]); #ifdef __TLS__ mixed cert; if (tls_available() && tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 1 && mappingp(cert = tls_certificate(ME, 0))) { mixed m, t; if (cert[0] != 0) { // log error 17 + cert here // and goodbye. P0(("%O encountered a cert verify error %O in %O\n", ME, cert[0], cert)) remove_interactive(ME); return 0; } if (m = cert["2.5.29.17:dNSName"]) { // FIXME: this does not yet handle wildcard DNS names P1(("%O believing dNSName %O\n", ME, m)) // probably also: register_target? // but be careful never to register_target wildcards if (stringp(m)) sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(m)); else foreach(t : m) sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t)); } //#ifdef _flag_allow_certificate_name_common // to be switched this year #ifndef _flag_disallow_certificate_name_common // assume that CN is a host // as this is an assumption only, we may NEVER register_target it // note: CN is deprecated for good reasons. else if (t = cert["2.5.4.3"]) { P1(("%O believing CN %O\n", ME, t)) sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t)); } #endif if (m = tls_query_connection_info(ME)) { P2(("%O is using the %O cipher.\n", ME, m[TLS_CIPHER])) // shouldn't our negotiation have ensured we have PFS? if (stringp(t = m[TLS_CIPHER]) &&! abbrev("DHE", t)) { // croak("_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher", // "Your cipher choice does not provide forward secrecy."); monitor_report( "_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher_details", object_name(ME) +" · using "+ t +" cipher"); //debug_message(sprintf( // "TLS connection info for %O is %O\n", ME, m)); //QUIT // are we ready for *this* !??? } } } #endif peerip = query_ip_number(ME) || "127.0.0.1"; #if __EFUN_DEFINED__(enable_binary) enable_binary(ME); #else # echo Driver compiled without enable_binary() - PSYC functionality warning! #endif input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG); call_out(#'quit, 90); flags = TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT; parser_init(); // FIXME unless(isServer()) { emit("|\n"); // initial greeting msg(0, "_request_features", 0); } return 1; } int disconnected(string remaining) { // i love to copy+paste source codes! thx for NOT sharing.. grrr #if DEBUG > 0 if (remaining && (!stringp(remaining) || strlen(remaining))) PP(("%O ignoring remaining data from socket: %O\n", ME, remaining)); #endif // wow.. a sincerely expected disconnect! if (flags & TCP_PENDING_DISCONNECT) return 1; monitor_report("_failure_network_circuit_disconnect", object_name(ME) +" · lost PSYC circuit"); return 0; // unexpected } // respond to the first empty packet first_response() { emit("|\n"); } // processes routing header variable assignments // basic version does no state mapping process_header(mixed varops) { mapping vars = ([ ]); foreach(mixed vop : varops) { string vname = vop[0]; switch(vop[1]) { case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_ASSIGN: instate[vname] = vop[2]; // fall thru case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_SET: vars[vname] = vop[2]; break; case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_AUGMENT: case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_DIMINISH: case C_GLYPH_MODIFIER_QUERY: CIRCUITERROR("header modifier with glyph other than ':', this is not implemented") break; default: CIRCUITERROR("header modifier with unknown glyph") break; } // FIXME: not every legal varname is a mmp varname // look at shared_memory("routing") if (!legal_keyword(vname) || abbrev("_INTERNAL", vname)) { CIRCUITERROR("illegal varname in header") } } return vars; } #define PSYC_TCP #include "dispatch.i" // request sender authentication and/or target acknowledgement // from the remote side void sender_verification(array(string) sourcehosts, array(string) targethosts) { // FIXME: wrong variables here mapping vars = ([ "_list_sources_hosts" : sourcehosts, "_list_targets_hosts" : targethosts, "_tag" : RANDHEXSTRING ]); // assumption: we have already resolved all targethosts and // they point to the remote ip foreach(string ho : targethosts) { sAuthenticated(ho); } msg(0, "_request_verification", 0, vars); } // receives a msg from the remote side // note: this is circuit-messaging void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data) { switch(mc) { case "_request_verification": if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) { array(string) targethosts = ({ }); foreach(string ho : vars["_list_targets_hosts"]) { if (is_localhost(ho)) { targethosts += ({ ho }); } } if (sizeof(vars["_list_sources_hosts"]) == 1) { // doing multiple resolutions in parallel is more complicated string ho = vars["_list_sources_hosts"][0]; if (qAuthenticated(ho)) { P0(("warning: trying to reverify authenticated host %O",ho)) } else { dns_resolve(ho, (: // FIXME: psyc/parse::deliver is much better here mixed rv = (["_list_targets_accepted_hosts":targethosts]); if (vars["_tag"]) rv["_tag_reply"] = vars["_tag"]; if ($1 == peerip) { sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(ho)); rv["_list_sources_verified_hosts"] = ({ ho }); } else { rv["_list_sources_rejected_hosts"] = ({ ho }); } msg(0, "_notice_verification", 0, rv); return; :)); } } else { // FIXME!!!! CIRCUITERROR("sorry, no more than one element in _list_sources_hosts currently"); } // keep tag if present!!! // resolve all of _list_sources_hosts // look at _list_targets_hosts and determine localhostiness } else { CIRCUITERROR("_request_verification is not allowed on TLS circuits."); // _request_verification is not allowed on tls circuits } break; case "_notice_features": // FIXME: watch for _list_using_modules if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) { P0(("removing call out\n")) remove_call_out(#'quit); flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT; } sTextPath(); if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) { // start hostname verification // rather: look at Q and look for the hostnames we need sender_verification(({ SERVER_HOST }), ({ peerhost })); } else { if (function_exists("runQ")) { runQ(); } } break; case "_notice_verification": P0(("_notice verification with %O\n", vars)) if (function_exists("runQ")) { runQ(); } break; default: P0(("%O got circuit_msg %O, not implemented\n", ME, mc)) break; } } // delivers a message to the remote side varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data, mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target) { string buf = ""; unless(vars) vars = ([ ]); buf = psyc_render(source, mc, data, vars, showingLog, target); #ifdef _flag_log_sockets_SPYC log_file("RAW_SPYC", "« %O\n%s\n", ME, buf); #endif return emit(buf); }