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psyced
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Code Issues 2 Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.psyced.org/git/psyced

This commit is contained in:
Gabor Adam Toth 2011-08-02 16:43:57 +02:00
parent 8d9cc4b1f5 3c20b2cd37
commit 7840f73c91
21 changed files with 243 additions and 138 deletions
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10
world/net/include/net.h
View File

@ -135,12 +135,16 @@
#endif
#ifdef MUD
# define NO_NEWBIES
# define _flag_disable_authorization
#endif
#ifdef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
# echo Please fix your #define REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
# define _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
#endif
#ifdef RELAY
# define NO_NEWBIES // same as REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY ?
// anyway, chance for some ifdef optimizations TODO
# define _flag_disable_authorization
# define IRCGATE_NICK "PSYC.EU"
# undef DEFAULT_USER_OBJECT
# define DEFAULT_USER_OBJECT IRC_PATH "ghost"

2
world/net/include/person.h
View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
# define ONLINE (ME && (interactive(ME) || (member(v("locations"), 0) && sizeof(v("locations")[0]))))
#endif
#ifdef NO_NEWBIES
#ifdef _flag_disable_authorization
# define IS_NEWBIE 0
#else
# define IS_NEWBIE (!v("password"))

2
world/net/jabber/active.c
View File

@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ tls_logon(result) {
mixed cert = tls_certificate(ME, 0);
P3(("active::certinfo %O\n", cert))
if (mappingp(cert)) {
unless (certificate_check_jabbername(hostname, cert)) {
unless (certificate_check_name(hostname, cert, "xmpp-server")) {
#ifdef _flag_report_bogus_certificates
monitor_report("_error_invalid_certificate_identity",
sprintf("%O presented a certificate that "

1
world/net/jabber/common.c
View File

@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ xmpp_error(node, xmpperror) {
return 0;
}
// deprecated - use certificate_check_name from library/tls.c instead
#ifdef WANT_S2S_TLS
certificate_check_jabbername(name, cert) {
mixed t;

2
world/net/jabber/disco.c
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
disco_info_root(vars) {
string featurelist;
featurelist = "<feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/muc'/>"
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
# ifndef _flag_disable_registration
# ifndef _flag_disable_registration_XMPP
"<feature var='jabber:iq:register'/>"

11
world/net/jabber/gateway.c
View File

@ -291,13 +291,14 @@ jabberMsg(XMLNode node) {
// paranoia note: as with XEP 0178 we might want to check dns anyway to
// protect against stolen certificates
if (mappingp(certinfo) && certinfo[0] == 0
&& node["@from"] && certificate_check_jabbername(node["@from"], certinfo)) {
P0(("dialback without dialback %O\n", certinfo))
&& node["@from"] && certificate_check_name(node["@from"], certinfo, "xmpp-server")) {
P2(("dialback without dialback %O\n", certinfo))
verify_connection(node["@to"], node["@from"], "valid");
} else {
sendmsg(origin,
"_dialback_request_verify", 0,
([ "_INTERNAL_target_jabber" : source,
// we shouldnt have to NAMEPREP a static string.. FIXME
"_INTERNAL_source_jabber" : NAMEPREP(_host_XMPP),
"_dialback_key" : node[Cdata],
"_tag" : streamid
@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ jabberMsg(XMLNode node) {
*/
int success = 0;
success = certificate_check_jabbername(t, certinfo);
success = certificate_check_name(t, certinfo, "xmpp-server");
if (success) {
emitraw("<success xmlns='" NS_XMPP "xmpp-sasl'/>");
P2(("successful sasl external authentication with "
@ -541,8 +542,8 @@ open_stream(XMLNode node) {
// sasl external if we know that it will succeed
// later on
if (node["@from"] &&
certificate_check_jabbername(node["@from"],
certinfo)) {
certificate_check_name(node["@from"],
certinfo, "xmpp-server")) {
packet += "<mechanisms xmlns='" NS_XMPP "xmpp-sasl'>";
packet += "<mechanism>EXTERNAL</mechanism>";
packet += "</mechanisms>";

1
world/net/jabber/jabber.h
View File

@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ virtual inherit JABBER_PATH "common";
// net/jabber is not ready for regular is_localhost
#define is_localhost(a) (lower_case(a)) == _host_XMPP
// but.. what about NAMEPREP here?
#define JABSOURCE "_INTERNAL_source_jabber"

12
world/net/jabber/server.c
View File

@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ jabberMsg(XMLNode node) {
case "jabber:iq:register":
if (node["@type"] == "get"){
string packet;
#if defined(REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY) || defined(_flag_disable_registration) || defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
#if defined(_flag_disable_unauthenticated_users) || defined(_flag_disable_registration) || defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
// super dirty.. this should all be in textdb
packet = sprintf("<iq type='result' id='%s'>"
"<query xmlns='jabber:iq:register'/>"
@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ jabberMsg(XMLNode node) {
emit(packet);
// QUIT
} else {
#if defined(REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY) || defined(_flag_disable_registration) || defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
#if defined(_flag_disable_unauthenticated_users) || defined(_flag_disable_registration) || defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
// TODO: generate some error as above
#else
user -> vSet("password", t[Cdata]);
@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ jabberMsg(XMLNode node) {
# endif
break;
#endif
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
case "ANONYMOUS":
unless(node[Cdata]) {
SASL_ERROR("incorrect-encoding")
@ -481,10 +481,12 @@ open_stream(XMLNode node) {
"<mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>"
#endif
"<mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>";
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
// sasl anonymous
"<mechanism>ANONYMOUS</mechanism>";
#endif
// here it makes sense to use check_jabbername
// but that is currently unused anyway
#if __EFUN_DEFINED__(tls_available)
if (tls_available() && tls_query_connection_state(ME) > 0
&& mappingp(certinfo) && certinfo[0] == 0
@ -494,7 +496,7 @@ open_stream(XMLNode node) {
#endif
features += "</mechanisms>";
features += "<auth xmlns='http://jabber.org/features/iq-auth'/>";
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
features += "<register xmlns='http://jabber.org/features/iq-register'/>";
#endif
}

3
world/net/jabber/user.c
View File

@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ logon() {
#endif
nodeHandler = #'jabberMsg;
set_prompt("");
// we shouldn't have to NAMEPREP our SERVER_HOST for each new user.. FIXME
myjid = NODEPREP(MYLOWERNICK) +"@" + NAMEPREP(SERVER_HOST);
myjidresource = myjid +"/"+ RESOURCEPREP(resource);
P2(("%O ready to rumble (%O)\n", myjidresource, ME))
@ -626,7 +627,7 @@ iq(XMLNode node) {
break;
}
break;
#if !defined(REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
#if !defined(_flag_disable_unauthenticated_users) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
case "jabber:iq:register":
switch(node["@type"]) {
case "get":

11
world/net/library.i
View File

@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static varargs void ready_freddie(vamixed ip) {
static void create() {
PROTECT("CREATE")
string t;
#ifndef __PIKE__
master = previous_object();
restore_object(DATA_PATH "library");
@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ static void create() {
#ifdef VOLATILE
D("VOLATILE flag set: Server will not save any data.\n");
#endif
myLowerCaseHost = lower_case(SERVER_HOST);
myLowerCaseHost = NAMEPREP(SERVER_HOST);
register_localhost(myLowerCaseHost);
#ifdef __PIKE__
//debug_write("Creating psyced library in Pike.\n");
@ -259,9 +261,10 @@ static void create() {
#ifdef JABBER_PATH
register_target("xmpp:"+ myLowerCaseHost);
# ifdef _host_XMPP
register_localhost(lower_case(_host_XMPP));
register_target(lower_case(_host_XMPP));
register_target("xmpp:"+ lower_case(_host_XMPP));
t = NAMEPREP(_host_XMPP);
register_localhost(t);
register_target(t);
register_target("xmpp:"+ t);
# endif
#endif
// base64decode("test2000");

75
world/net/library/tls.c
View File

@ -82,3 +82,78 @@ mapping tls_certificate(object who, int longnames) {
P2(("cert is %O\n", cert))
return cert;
}
// generalized variant of the old certificate_check_jabbername
// RFC 6125 describes the process in more detail
int certificate_check_name(string name, mixed cert, string scheme) {
mixed t;
string idn;
// FIXME: should probably be more careful about internationalized
// domain names - need testcases
#define WILDCARD_MATCH(thing) (strlen(thing) > 2 && thing[0] == '*' && thing[1] == '.' && trail(thing[2..], name))
/* this does not support wildcards if there is more than one
* id-on-xmppAddr/CN
* API Note: name MUST be an utf8 string
*/
unless(name && cert && mappingp(cert)) return 0;
name = NAMEPREP(name);
// subjectAlternativeName - dNSName
if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:dNSName"])) {
if (stringp(t)) t = ({ t });
foreach(string t2 : t) {
t2 = NAMEPREP(t2);
if (name == t2 || WILDCARD_MATCH(t2))
return 1;
}
}
// subjectAlternativeName - SRV ID - FIXME
// unfortunately, the only ones I have encountered so far were ... unusable
if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"])) {
P2(("encountered SRVName, please tell fippo: %O\n", t))
}
// URI ID - FIXME
// not seen yet
#if 0
// id-on-xmppAddr - have not seen them issued by anyone but
// startcom and those usually include dnsname, too
if ((t = cert["2.5.29.17:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"])) {
if (pointerp(t)) {
if (member(t, name) != -1) return 1;
foreach(string cn : t) {
if (NAMEPREP(cn) == name) return 1;
}
}
else if (name == NAMEPREP(t))
return 1;
}
#endif
// commonName - deprecated to put the host here but...
// this is only to be checked if no subjectAlternativeName is present
if (!cert["2.5.29.17"] && (t = cert["2.5.4.3"])) { // common name
if (pointerp(t)) { // does that happen?! I don't think so...
// fast way - works for traditional hostnames
if (member(t, name) != -1) return 1;
// look for idn encoded stuff
foreach(string cn : t) {
idn = NAMEPREP(idna_to_unicode(cn));
if (idn == name) return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef __IDNA__
idn = NAMEPREP(idna_to_unicode(t));
#else
idn = NAMEPREP(t);
#endif
if (idn == name || WILDCARD_MATCH(idn))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}

2
world/net/person.c
View File

@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ checkPassword(try, method, salt, args, cb, varargs cbargs) {
#endif
// why here?
//while (remove_call_out(#'quit) != -1);
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
# ifdef AUTH_HMAC_SECRET
if (IS_NEWBIE && method != "hmac-sha1-shared") ARETURN(1)
# else

6
world/net/psyc/circuit.c
View File

@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ int logon(int neverfails) {
P1(("%O believing dNSName %O\n", ME, m))
// probably also: register_target?
// but be careful never to register_target wildcards
if (stringp(m)) sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(m));
else foreach(t : m) sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
if (stringp(m)) sAuthenticated(m);
else foreach(t : m) sAuthenticated(t);
}
//#ifdef _flag_allow_certificate_name_common // to be switched this year
# ifndef _flag_disallow_certificate_name_common
@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int logon(int neverfails) {
// note: CN is deprecated for good reasons.
else if (t = cert["2.5.4.3"]) {
P1(("%O believing CN %O\n", ME, t))
sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
sAuthenticated(t);
}
# endif
if (m = tls_query_connection_info(ME)) {

3
world/net/psyc/library.i
View File

@ -343,6 +343,9 @@ int psyc_sendmsg(mixed target, string mc, mixed data, mapping vars,
// nothing else is possible, but some clients may
// no longer be able to connect to you...
}
#ifdef USE_SPYC
o -> sender_verification(SERVER_UNIFORM, u[URoot]);
#endif
register_target($4, o);
register_target(psychopo, o);
register_target(psycippo, o);

21
world/net/psyc/parse.i
View File

@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ vamixed getdata(string a) {
#else
# ifdef PSYC_TCP
// Authenticated
} else if (qAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(u[UHost]))) {
} else if (qAuthenticated(u[UHost])) {
if (u[UTransport] && (u[UTransport] !=
# if __EFUN_DEFINED__(tls_query_connection_state)
tls_query_connection_state() ? "s" :
@ -997,17 +997,34 @@ protected int deliver(mixed ip, string host, string mc, string buffer, mapping c
}
P1(("RELAYING denied from %O to %O (%O)\n",
source, t, ME))
#if 0
monitor_report("_warning_unsupported_relay",
S("%O is trying to find %O here. Relaying denied.\n", ME, t));
croak("_failure_unsupported_relay",
//"Well done mate, you crashed me.");
"Relaying denied: [_host] is not a hostname of ours.",
([ "_host": u[UHost] ]));
#if 0
// TODO: we quit here to not do the same hash-lookup
// in rootmsg again.
// (didn't get it? nevermind.. it's just el's sick humor)
QUIT
#else
// we do not QUIT here as an evil attacker may
// CNAME his evil.com to us and try to disrupt
// our communications with some popular server
// by making us drop an otherwise very popular
// circuit. then again, what if a sender SHOULD
// not send to us with any other hostname but
// the one we announced ourselves as _source
// when we sent our first greeting() ? then we
// could just dump "illegal" transmissions.
// well, we don't need to be so harsh against
// multi domain hosters really: relaying is
// denied by default so the attacker needs to
// be a user on the sending server. in the end
// it's a question of trust: don't let zero
// trust users send funny amounts of data.
return 1;
#endif
}
// .. yes.. add is_localhost check here, but without callback

2
world/net/root.c
View File

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ msg(source, mc, data, vars, showingLog, target) {
"version", // _tab
"time", "lasttime"
#endif
#if !defined(REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration) &&!defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
#if !defined(_flag_disable_unauthenticated_users) && !defined(_flag_disable_registration) &&!defined(_flag_disable_registration_XMPP)
"registration",
#endif
#ifndef VOLATILE

6
world/net/server.c
View File

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ hello(ni, elm, try, method, salt) {
ni, try, elm);
}
#ifdef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY // TODO: rename into a _flag
#ifdef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
ohYeah(whatever) {
input_to(#'ohYeah, input_to_settings);
// input ignore warning? inverting mc's is really a good idea!
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ authChecked(int result, ni, try, elm) {
// return;
// }
}
#ifdef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifdef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
else {
if (user -> isNewbie()) {
#ifdef PSYC_SYNCHRONIZE
@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ authChecked(int result, ni, try, elm) {
return promptForPassword(user);
#endif
}
#ifndef REGISTERED_USERS_ONLY
#ifndef _flag_disable_unauthenticated_users
// added user->isNewbie() check for ircers
if (user->online() && user->isNewbie()
#ifdef _flag_log_hosts

168
world/net/spyc/circuit.c
View File

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ mapping outstate;
mapping legal_senders;
array(mixed) verify_queue = ({ });
volatile int flags = 0;
@ -74,24 +75,26 @@ varargs mixed croak(string mc, string data, vamapping vars, vamixed source) {
return 0;
}
#ifdef USE_VERIFICATION
// request sender authentication and/or target acknowledgement
// from the remote side
void sender_verification(array(string) sourcehosts, array(string) targethosts)
void sender_verification(string sourcehost, mixed targethost)
{
// FIXME: wrong variables here
mapping vars = ([ "_list_sources_hosts" : sourcehosts,
"_list_targets_hosts" : targethosts,
"_tag" : RANDHEXSTRING ]);
// assumption: we have already resolved all targethosts and
// they point to the remote ip
foreach(string ho : targethosts) {
sAuthenticated(ho);
unless(interactive()) {
verify_queue += ({ ({ sourcehost, targethost }) });
return;
}
msg(0, "_request_verification", 0, vars);
mapping vars = ([ "_uniform_source" : sourcehost,
"_uniform_target" : targethost,
"_tag" : RANDHEXSTRING ]);
P0(("sender_verification(%O, %O)\n", sourcehost, targethost))
// since we send packets to them we should trust them to
// send packets to us, eh?
if (stringp(targethost)) {
targethost = parse_uniform(targethost);
}
sAuthenticated(targethost[UHost]);
msg(0, "_request_authorization", 0, vars);
}
#endif
// gets called during socket logon
int logon(int failure) {
@ -117,10 +120,10 @@ int logon(int failure) {
// probably also: register_target?
// but be careful never to register_target wildcards
if (stringp(m))
sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(m));
sAuthenticated(m);
else
foreach(t : m)
sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
sAuthenticated(t);
}
//#ifdef _flag_allow_certificate_name_common // to be switched this year
#ifndef _flag_disallow_certificate_name_common
@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ int logon(int failure) {
// note: CN is deprecated for good reasons.
else if (t = cert["2.5.4.3"]) {
P1(("%O believing CN %O\n", ME, t))
sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(t));
sAuthenticated(t);
}
#endif
if (m = tls_query_connection_info(ME)) {
@ -161,20 +164,12 @@ int logon(int failure) {
// FIXME
unless(isServer()) {
emit("|\n"); // initial greeting
#ifdef USE_FEATURES
// we have no features to request or offer
msg(0, "_request_features", 0);
#else
# ifdef USE_VERIFICATION
// start hostname verification
// rather: look at Q and look for the hostnames we need
sender_verification(({ SERVER_HOST }), ({ peerhost }));
# else
if (function_exists("runQ")) {
runQ();
if (sizeof(verify_queue)) {
foreach(mixed t : verify_queue) {
sender_verification(t[0], t[1]);
}
verify_queue = ({ });
}
# endif
#endif
}
return 1;
}
@ -209,74 +204,66 @@ first_response() {
// receives a msg from the remote side
// note: this is circuit-messaging
void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data) {
mapping rv = ([ ]);
mixed *u;
switch(mc) {
case "_request_verification":
if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) {
array(string) targethosts = ({ });
foreach(string ho : vars["_list_targets_hosts"]) {
if (is_localhost(ho)) {
targethosts += ({ ho });
}
}
if (sizeof(vars["_list_sources_hosts"]) == 1) {
// doing multiple resolutions in parallel is more complicated
string ho = vars["_list_sources_hosts"][0];
if (qAuthenticated(ho)) {
P0(("warning: trying to reverify authenticated host %O",ho))
} else {
dns_resolve(ho, (:
// FIXME: psyc/parse::deliver is much better here
mixed rv = (["_list_targets_accepted_hosts":targethosts]);
case "_request_authorization":
if (vars["_tag"]) {
rv["_tag_relay"] = vars["_tag"];
}
if (!vars["_uniform_source"] && vars["_uniform_target"]) {
CIRCUITERROR("_request_authorization without uniform source and/or target?!");
}
if (vars["_tag"]) rv["_tag_reply"] = vars["_tag"];
if ($1 == peerip) {
sAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(ho));
rv["_list_sources_verified_hosts"] = ({ ho });
} else {
rv["_list_sources_rejected_hosts"] = ({ ho });
}
msg(0, "_notice_verification", 0, rv);
return;
:));
rv["_uniform_target"] = vars["_uniform_target"];
rv["_uniform_source"] = vars["_uniform_source"];
u = parse_uniform(vars["_uniform_target"]);
if (!(u && is_localhost(u[UHost]))) {
msg(0, "_error_invalid_uniform_target", "[_uniform_target] is not hosted here.", rv);
return;
}
u = parse_uniform(vars["_uniform_source"]);
// qAuthenticated does that:u[UHost] = NAMEPREP(u[UHost]);
if (qAuthenticated(u[UHost])) {
// possibly different _uniform_target only
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
P0(("removing call out\n"))
remove_call_out(#'quit);
flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
}
} else {
// FIXME!!!!
CIRCUITERROR("sorry, no more than one element in _list_sources_hosts currently");
P0(("more than one element in _list_sources_hosts: %O\n", vars["_list_sources_hosts"]))
}
// keep tag if present!!!
// resolve all of _list_sources_hosts
// look at _list_targets_hosts and determine localhostiness
msg(0, "_status_authorization", 0, rv);
// } else if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 1 && ...) {
// FIXME
} else {
CIRCUITERROR("_request_verification is not allowed on TLS circuits.");
string ho = u[UHost];
// FIXME: this actually needs to consider srv, too...
dns_resolve(ho, (:
// FIXME: psyc/parse::deliver is much better here
P0(("resolved %O to %O, expecting %O\n", ho, $1, peerip))
if ($1 == peerip) {
sAuthenticated(ho);
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
P0(("removing call out\n"))
remove_call_out(#'quit);
flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
}
msg(0, "_status_authorization", 0, rv);
} else {
msg(0, "_error_invalid_uniform_source", 0, rv);
}
return;
:));
}
break;
case "_notice_features":
// FIXME: watch for _list_using_modules
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
P0(("removing call out\n"))
remove_call_out(#'quit);
flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
}
sTextPath();
#ifdef USE_FEATURES
if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 0) {
# ifdef USE_VERIFICATION
// start hostname verification
// rather: look at Q and look for the hostnames we need
sender_verification(({ SERVER_HOST }), ({ peerhost }));
# endif
} else {
if (function_exists("runQ")) {
runQ();
}
}
#endif
break;
case "_notice_verification":
P0(("_notice verification with %O\n", vars))
case "_status_authorization":
P0(("_status authorization with %O\n", vars))
// this means we can send from _uniform_source to _uniform_target
// we already did sAuthenticated _uniform_target before so we can't get
// tricked into it here
if (function_exists("runQ")) {
runQ();
runQ();
// actually runQ(_uniform_source, _uniform_target)
}
break;
default:
@ -290,6 +277,7 @@ varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data,
mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target) {
string buf = "";
mixed u;
unless(vars) vars = ([ ]);
buf = render_psyc(source, mc, data, vars, showingLog, target);

8
world/net/spyc/dispatch.i
View File

@ -161,14 +161,12 @@ void dispatch(mapping rvars, mapping evars, mixed method, mixed body) {
unless (u = parse_uniform(t)) {
DISPATCHERROR("logical source is not a uniform\n")
}
#ifdef USE_VERIFICATION
# ifdef PSYC_TCP
unless (qAuthenticated(NAMEPREP(u[UHost]))) {
#ifdef PSYC_TCP
unless (qAuthenticated(u[UHost])) {
DISPATCHERROR("non-authenticated host\n")
}
# else
#else
// TODO?
# endif
#endif
}

33
world/net/spyc/server.c
View File

@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ void greet() {
// should be sharing code with net/psyc and do a proper greeting
// three separate packets follow (thus three emits)
//emit(S_GLYPH_PACKET_DELIMITER "\n");
/*
emit("\
:_source\t"+ SERVER_UNIFORM +"\n\
:_target_peer\tpsyc://"+ peeraddr +"/\n\
@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ _status_circuit\n" S_GLYPH_PACKET_DELIMITER "\n");
#ifdef _flag_log_sockets_SPYC
log_file("RAW_SPYC", "« %O greeted.\n", ME);
#endif
*/
}
static void resolved(mixed host, mixed tag) {
@ -176,20 +178,27 @@ static void resolved(mixed host, mixed tag) {
sTextPath();
greet();
// FIXME: determine response to greeting
// instead of this dummy
msg(0, "_notice_features", 0, tag ? ([ "_tag_reply" : tag ]) : 0);
//msg(0, "_notice_features", 0, tag ? ([ "_tag_reply" : tag ]) : 0);
}
void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data) {
switch(mc) {
case "_request_features": // only servers handle _request_features
interrupt_parse();
dns_rresolve(peerip, #'resolved, vars && vars["_tag"]);
break;
default:
return ::circuit_msg(mc, vars, data);
}
int logon(int nothing) {
P2(("%O accepted TCP from %O (%s:%O)\n", ME,
query_ip_name(), query_ip_number(), peerport))
// we could set the next_input_to and reply with _failure until
// hostname is resolved .. TODO ... no, we need some form
// of queuing for the scripts which do not wait.. why? don't we
// squeeze received packets thru dns-lambdas anyway?
// peerport has either positive or negative value
//peeraddr = peerip+":"+peerport;
::logon(0);
#if 0 //def EXPERIMENTAL
// added this because greet() happens after dns resolution and
// some quick clients may not be waiting that long.. then again
// if they do, they deserve other treatment
sTextPath();
#endif
dns_rresolve(peerip, #'resolved);
return 1; // success
}
#endif // LIBPSYC

2
world/net/trust.c
View File

@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ volatile mapping authhosts;
void sAuthenticated(string hostname) {
P3(("sAuthenticated: %O\n", hostname))
unless(authhosts && mappingp(authhosts)) authhosts = ([ ]);
hostname = NAMEPREP(hostname);
authhosts[hostname] = 1;
}
int qAuthenticated(mixed hostname) {
P3(("qAuthenticated %O, %O\n", hostname, authhosts))
unless (authhosts && mappingp(authhosts)) return 0;
hostname = NAMEPREP(hostname);
return member(authhosts, hostname);
}