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psyced/world/net/spyc/circuit.c

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// vim:foldmethod=marker:syntax=lpc:noexpandtab
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// $Id: circuit.c,v 1.38 2008/10/14 19:02:29 lynx Exp $
#include "psyc.h"
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#ifdef LIBPSYC
#include <net.h>
#include <uniform.h>
#include <tls.h>
#include <text.h>
inherit NET_PATH "trust";
inherit NET_PATH "spyc/parse";
virtual inherit NET_PATH "output";
volatile string peerhost;
volatile string peeraddr;
volatile string peerip;
volatile int peerport;
volatile string netloc;
#ifndef NEW_RENDER
# define NEW_RENDER
#endif
#include "render.i"
// this is completely anti-psyc. it should take mcs as arguments
// and look up the actual message from textdb.. FIXME
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#define CIRCUITERROR(reason) { \
croak("_error_circuit", "circuit error: " \
reason); \
return 0; \
}
mapping instate = ([ ]);
mapping outstate;
mapping legal_senders;
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array(mixed) verify_queue = ({ });
volatile int flags = 0;
void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data); // prototype
varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data,
mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target); // prototype
protected void quit(); // prototype
void runQ();
int isServer() { return 0; }
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void connection_peek(string data) {
#if __EFUN_DEFINED__(enable_binary)
enable_binary(ME);
#else
raise_error("Driver compiled without enable_binary()");
#endif
}
void feed(string data) {
input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG);
::feed(data);
}
// yes, this is a funny implementation of croak
// it does not use msg(). Yes, that is intended
varargs mixed croak(string mc, string data, vamapping vars, vamixed source) {
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PT(("croak(%O) in %O (%O)\n", mc, ME, query_ip_name()))
unless (data) data = T(mc, "");
binary_message(sprintf("\n%s\n%s\n|\n", mc, data));
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// right behaviour for all croaks!?
remove_interactive(ME);
// destruct(ME);
return 0;
}
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// request sender authentication and/or target acknowledgement
// from the remote side
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void sender_verification(string sourcehost, mixed targethost)
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{
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unless(interactive()) {
verify_queue += ({ ({ sourcehost, targethost }) });
return;
}
mapping vars = ([ "_uniform_source" : sourcehost,
"_uniform_target" : targethost,
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"_tag" : RANDHEXSTRING ]);
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P0(("sender_verification(%O, %O)\n", sourcehost, targethost))
// since we send packets to them we should trust them to
// send packets to us, eh?
if (stringp(targethost)) {
targethost = parse_uniform(targethost);
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}
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sAuthenticated(targethost[UHost]);
msg(0, "_request_authorization", 0, vars);
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}
// gets called during socket logon
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int logon(int failure) {
sAuthHosts(([ ])); // reset authhosts
legal_senders = ([ ]);
instate = ([ "_INTERNAL_origin" : ME ]);
outstate = ([ ]);
#ifdef __TLS__
mixed cert;
if (tls_available() && tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 1 && mappingp(cert = tls_certificate(ME, 0))) {
mixed m, t;
if (cert[0] != 0) {
// log error 17 + cert here
// and goodbye.
P0(("%O encountered a cert verify error %O in %O\n", ME,
cert[0], cert))
remove_interactive(ME);
return 0;
}
if (m = cert["2.5.29.17:dNSName"]) {
// FIXME: this does not yet handle wildcard DNS names
P1(("%O believing dNSName %O\n", ME, m))
// probably also: register_target?
// but be careful never to register_target wildcards
if (stringp(m))
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sAuthenticated(m);
else
foreach(t : m)
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sAuthenticated(t);
}
//#ifdef _flag_allow_certificate_name_common // to be switched this year
#ifndef _flag_disallow_certificate_name_common
// assume that CN is a host
// as this is an assumption only, we may NEVER register_target it
// note: CN is deprecated for good reasons.
else if (t = cert["2.5.4.3"]) {
P1(("%O believing CN %O\n", ME, t))
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sAuthenticated(t);
}
#endif
if (m = tls_query_connection_info(ME)) {
P2(("%O is using the %O cipher.\n", ME, m[TLS_CIPHER]))
// shouldn't our negotiation have ensured we have PFS?
if (stringp(t = m[TLS_CIPHER]) &&! abbrev("DHE", t)) {
// croak("_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher",
// "Your cipher choice does not provide forward secrecy.");
monitor_report(
"_warning_circuit_encryption_cipher_details",
object_name(ME) +" · using "+ t +" cipher");
//debug_message(sprintf(
// "TLS connection info for %O is %O\n", ME, m));
//QUIT // are we ready for *this* !???
}
}
}
#endif
peerip = query_ip_number(ME) || "127.0.0.1";
input_to(#'feed, INPUT_IGNORE_BANG);
call_out(#'quit, 90);
flags = TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
parser_init();
// FIXME
unless(isServer()) {
emit("|\n"); // initial greeting
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if (sizeof(verify_queue)) {
foreach(mixed t : verify_queue) {
sender_verification(t[0], t[1]);
}
verify_queue = ({ });
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}
}
return 1;
}
int disconnected(string remaining) {
// i love to copy+paste source codes! thx for NOT sharing.. grrr
#if DEBUG > 0
if (remaining && (!stringp(remaining) || strlen(remaining)))
PP(("%O ignoring remaining data from socket: %O\n", ME,
remaining));
#endif
// wow.. a sincerely expected disconnect!
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_DISCONNECT) return 1;
#ifdef _flag_enable_report_failure_network_circuit_disconnect
monitor_report("_failure_network_circuit_disconnect",
object_name(ME) +" · lost PSYC circuit");
#else
P1(("%O disconnected unexpectedly\n", ME))
#endif
return 0; // unexpected
}
// respond to the first empty packet
first_response() {
emit("|\n");
}
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#define PSYC_TCP
#include "dispatch.i"
// receives a msg from the remote side
// note: this is circuit-messaging
void circuit_msg(string mc, mapping vars, string data) {
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mapping rv = ([ ]);
mixed *u;
switch(mc) {
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case "_request_authorization":
if (vars["_tag"]) {
rv["_tag_relay"] = vars["_tag"];
}
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if (!vars["_uniform_source"] && vars["_uniform_target"]) {
CIRCUITERROR("_request_authorization without uniform source and/or target?!");
}
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rv["_uniform_target"] = vars["_uniform_target"];
rv["_uniform_source"] = vars["_uniform_source"];
u = parse_uniform(vars["_uniform_target"]);
if (!(u && is_localhost(u[UHost]))) {
msg(0, "_error_invalid_uniform_target", "[_uniform_target] is not hosted here.", rv);
return;
}
u = parse_uniform(vars["_uniform_source"]);
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// qAuthenticated does that:u[UHost] = NAMEPREP(u[UHost]);
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if (qAuthenticated(u[UHost])) {
// possibly different _uniform_target only
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
P0(("removing call out\n"))
remove_call_out(#'quit);
flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
}
msg(0, "_status_authorization", 0, rv);
// } else if (tls_query_connection_state(ME) == 1 && ...) {
// FIXME
} else {
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string ho = u[UHost];
// FIXME: this actually needs to consider srv, too...
dns_resolve(ho, (:
// FIXME: psyc/parse::deliver is much better here
P0(("resolved %O to %O, expecting %O\n", ho, $1, peerip))
if ($1 == peerip) {
sAuthenticated(ho);
if (flags & TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT) {
P0(("removing call out\n"))
remove_call_out(#'quit);
flags -= TCP_PENDING_TIMEOUT;
}
msg(0, "_status_authorization", 0, rv);
} else {
msg(0, "_error_invalid_uniform_source", 0, rv);
}
return;
:));
}
break;
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case "_status_authorization":
P0(("_status authorization with %O\n", vars))
// this means we can send from _uniform_source to _uniform_target
// we already did sAuthenticated _uniform_target before so we can't get
// tricked into it here
if (function_exists("runQ")) {
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runQ();
// actually runQ(_uniform_source, _uniform_target)
}
break;
default:
P0(("%O got circuit_msg %O, not implemented\n", ME, mc))
break;
}
}
// delivers a message to the remote side
varargs int msg(string source, string mc, string data,
mapping vars, int showingLog, mixed target) {
string buf = "";
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mixed u;
unless(vars) vars = ([ ]);
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buf = render_psyc(source, mc, data, vars, showingLog, target);
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#ifdef _flag_log_sockets_SPYC
log_file("RAW_SPYC", "« %O\n%s\n", ME, buf);
#endif
return emit(buf);
}
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#endif // LIBPSYC