* WinTrust.lib is responsible for the MSASN1.dll sideloading issue described in #1877,
so, since we only use it for WinVerifyTrustEx(), hook into that function manually.
* Closes#1877 for the MinGW side.
* Note that we will probably try to use the method suggested by @assarbad and documented at
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1851267/mingw-gcc-delay-loaded-dll-equivalent/70416894#70416894
to try to put an end to the problem of DLL side loading.
* ef2ff7179d was supposed to apply delay loading to our DLLs, for all MSVC builds,
thereby preventing sideloading attacks, but the patch actually only set the DelayLoadDLLs
property for Debug builds and not Release builds, with the result that side loading could
still be triggered for the Release executables, as demonstrated in #1877.
* This patch therefore properly sets the DelayLoadDLLs for all builds, which should take care
of the side loading vulnerability at least for MSVC executables.
* A subsequent patch will still be needed for MinGW, since there is no equivalent to DelayLoadDLLs.
* This addresses part of #1877.
* Hypothetically if the user's current directory contains a malicious DLL that DLL
could be loaded instead of the one in System32.
* Whereas the previous patch should have taken care of the one DLL referenced by
Rufus that may be vulnerable to this attack (version.dll), we nonetheless add
delay loading for all the libraries we reference as a precautionary measure.
* One can confirm that this works by using dumpbin.exe /IMPORTS to make sure
a specific DLL is delay loaded. Then putting a breakpoint in the delay load
hook should also confirm that the hook is used.
* Closes#1838
* This is part of #1838, where we need to sort the version.dll sideloading problem for MinGW.
* A subsequent patch will be applied to MSVC, to more generally delay the loading of DLLs.
* Also fix a typo with an assert expression.
* Use sources/compatresources.dll, when available, to try to detect the Windows ISO version and build.
* Also report what facility we use for formatting.
Yes!!! We are finally *much* faster than 7-zip for SHA-256, even though
we are also computing MD5 and SHA-1 in parallel. Here are some averaged
comparative results, against the 5.71 GB Win10_20H2_EnglishInternational_x64.iso
(SHA-256 = 08535b6dd0a4311f562e301c3c344b4aefd2e69a82168426b9971d6f8cab35e1):
* Windows' PowerShell Get-FileHash: 48s
* 7-zip's SHA-256 : 31s
* Rufus (64-bit release version) : 23s
* Only UEFI boot for now (GRUB) & requires a post 2019.07.26 ISO for Ubuntu.
* This adds the relevant persistence/persistent kernel option to the conf file, sets the
expected volume label and creates a /persistence.conf file where needed.
* Also improve token parsing by ensuring a token is followed by at least one white space.
* Only enabled when Advanced format options are shown
* Also enable reading of extfs volume label
* Also improve GRUB lookup fallback
* Also fix possible truncation when sanitizing labels
* Also write a zeroed MBR when non-bootable is selected
* Add display of persistence controls on relevant images
* Add progress on ext3 formatting and improve error reporting
* Also improve MountVolume() and fix some Coverity warnings
* This should help Windows users who create a GPT/UEFI drive and try to use it in BIOS/Legacy
* Also make sure that we take into account the split space for both "SELECT" and "DOWNLOAD"
* Instead of x86_32 and x86_64.
* This should aid with our appxbundle creation and if Microsoft want to
be wholly incorrect in their arch designations, who am I to judge?...
* *THIS* is what you need to do to replace Microsoft's broken SetDllDirectory("")
implementation and mitigate DLL sideloading from local directories.
* Also fix some comment typos
