* This allows *runtime* validation of UEFI bootable media, such as Windows
or Linux installers, which, considering the unreliability of USB flash
drives, we assert is a a much better proposal than write-time validation
that utilities like balenaEcther (and to a lesser extent MCT) provide.
* Based on uefi-md5sum (https://github.com/pbatard/uefi-md5sum).
* Unconditionally activated on ISO extraction for GPT targets for now.
This will be changed to a user selectable option later.
* As opposed to what we originally asserted, Microsoft did enact a blanket revocation
in SkuSiPolicy.p7b for all post 1703 up to 2305 Windows UEFI bootloaders.
* As a result, unconditionally copying SkuSiPolicy.p7b will result in media as recent
as Windows 11 22H2 (v1) being flagged as revoked, which we don't want to enforce as
long as Microsoft themselves haven't entered the enforcing phase of their Black
Lotus mitigation (currently planned for early 2024).
* Because of this, while we add some revocation detection for post 1703 bootloaders,
we set it to only go as far as 20H1 for now, which means that all post 20H1 Windows
10 media and all Windows 11 media will not yet be flagged by Rufus as revoked and
will still boot in a Secure Boot environment due to lack of an SkuSiPolicy.p7b.
* Ultimately, per #2244 we may look for a BOOTMGRSECURITYVERSIONNUMBER resource to
blanket revoke all post 1703 - pre 2305 Windows UEFI bootloaders.
* Also remove the now unused comdlg32 library from the linker.
* Remove duplicates from Microsoft's SKUSiPolicy.p7b
* Also display the number of revoked from embedded
* Also use Microsoft's official capitalization for SKUSiPolicy.p7b's target path
* Instead of embedding the content of the most recent revoked bootloader hashes in db.h
we now parse the system's SkuSiPolicy.p7b to do so. This has the drawback of not alerting
users running Rufus on systems where SkuSiPolicy.p7b is not up to date, but I believe the
trade-off is worth it.
* We now also copy the system's SkuSiPolicy.p7b to the created media when possible (for
Windows 10 or later), so that Microsoft's WDAC UEFI revocations can apply during boot.
* Considering that alerting users to potential security breaches that may be
exploited by boot media should also be performed by application that create
them, we add detection for all the currently known revoked UEFI bootloaders,
be it the ones from the official UEFI DBX as well as the ones from Windows'
SkuSiPolicy.p7b, and warn the user when one such bootloader is detected on
their source media.
* Note that, to actually be revoked, the bootloaders flagged through SkuSiPolicy
require the copying of the .p7b to the boot media, which we are currently
not enacting but will perform in a subsequent commit.
* Also fix a Coverity warning in hash.c.