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.gitignore
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.gitignore
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*.pdf
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Makefile
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Makefile
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all:
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groff -ms omemo-discord.ms -T pdf > omemo-discord.pdf
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omemo-discord.ms
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omemo-discord.ms
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.TL
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OMEMO over Discord
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.AU
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Luna Mendes
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.AB
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This paper describes what implementors could do to provide end-to-end encryption
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on Discord using the OMEMO standard from XMPP.
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This is a draft document.
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.AE
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.NH
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Disclaimer
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.PP
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An OMEMO session can not be fully carried out over Discord due to limitations
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of the Discord API.
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.NH
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Key negotiation / distribution
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.PP
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Negotiating keys and prekeys in OMEMO use the User's originating XMPP server and
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XEP-0163: Personal Eventing Protocol to signal device key changes.
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.PP
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Discord does not provide any semantics to what XEP-0163 provides, so
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implementors are allowed to improvise, and implement a generic pub/sub server.
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.B "However"
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notice that the protocol such a server provides can leak metadata about who is
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talking with who, and so, extra care must be given to implementations going down
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such paths.
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.PP
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The second approach is leveraging the existing Discord protocol to provide, at
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least, key fingerprint material. Such an approach
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.I "could"
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involve the existing user profiles, and the fact that you can make a League of
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Legends entry without verification. USER_UPDATE events would be dispatched
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when such device keys change.
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.PP
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If implementations go down the second approach, they could embed the key
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material inside the entries as well, but that might prove itself difficult,
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as there is a limit to how much you can insert on an entry. Same thing applies
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to the key fingerprints. Implementations should consider compressing. They
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should also consider a separate key server to give keys based on the key
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fingerprints so conversation can carry on.
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.NH
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Key verification
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.PP
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Keys must be verified out of band to prevent a MITM attack by Discord when
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negotiating the keys.
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.NH
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On the subject of search
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.PP
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Message search is something that is claimed to not work once you decide on using
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a cryptosystem, however, search is possible. There are two approaches to it:
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.NH 2
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Client-side search
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.PP
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The first one decides that the Discord Client stores the message plaintext on
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itself. The first obvious drawback is the overhead a client must have to do a
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search, and that is even more expensive when you consider the Web technologies
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powering the Client.
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.NH 2
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Server-side search
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.PP
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This involves a
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.I "separate"
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server that the client can send encrypted message history to.
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.PP
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When searching, the client can ask for a batch of messages, decrypt, then
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search through them. However the obvious drawbacks are that you need a separate
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server with storage, and the implied bandwidth and decryption costs of searching
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this way.
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.NH 2
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Conclusion
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.PP
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All XMPP clients use client-side message storage for unencrypted operation.
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However, due to how Discord works, users assume the storage is server-side,
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causing a conflict of interests in the part of what users assume Discord works
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onto how a theoretical OMEMO-over-Discord provider provides.
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.NH
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On the subject of JavaScript
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.PP
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Notice that all the work described here can go to waste if Discord is still able
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to send you maliciously crafted JavaScript for the client to execute and dump
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all its private keys to Discord.
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.PP
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Because of that, it is recommended to design a new client that is fully native
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and extensible to carry on the high expectations of a cryptosystem. "Signing
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a plugin" is not enough, as Discord can still send their own JavaScript that
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messes with the plugin's operation after signature verification.
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.PP
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The bottom line is that if you can't trust the runtime then it is not secure.
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Another case where this line of thought is valid is in ProtonMail, where they
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can send you malicious JavaScript that just records everything. ProtonMail
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answers that such attacks are not worrisome when we have things like SNI.
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.PP
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The author is in the "side" that if you can't trust ProtonMail from sending
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malicious JavaScript code, then you can't use ProtonMail. It might be more
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nuanced than that, considering how the client is open and "can" be "built"
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by people if wanted.
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