Daemon RPC version is now composed of a major and minor number,
so that incompatible changes bump the major version, while
compatible changes can still bump the minor version without
causing clients to unnecessarily complain.
Those aren't yet in the blockchain, so will not be found
(and aren't yet known, since it depends on where exactly the
tx will be mined in the next block or blocks)
I forgot to bump it previously when changing RPC, most notably
for the addition of the unlocked field in the histogram RPC.
This causes new wallets to not realize when they're talking to
an older daemon, and get confused trying to get outputs to use
as fake outs. This otherwise gratuitous bump ensures than old
daemons will be detected by wallets using this code.
10a79ea daemon: report transaction relay status in print_pool* commands (moneromooo-monero)
1e16366 core: notify the txpool when transactions are relayed (moneromooo-monero)
f3c374f tx_pool: set relayed flag on relay (moneromooo-monero)
25% of the outputs are selected from the last 5 days (if possible),
in order to avoid the common case of sending recently received
outputs again. 25% and 5 days are subject to review later, since
it's just a wallet level change.
This is intended to catch traffic coming from a web browser,
so we avoid issues with a web page sending a transfer RPC to
the wallet. Requiring a particular user agent can act as a
simple password scheme, while we wait for 0MQ and proper
authentication to be merged.
Keep the immediate direct deps at the library that depends on them,
declare deps as PUBLIC so that targets that link against that library
get the library's deps as transitive deps.
Break dep cycle between blockchain_db <-> crytonote_core.
No code refactoring, just hide cycle from cmake so that
it doesn't complain (cycles are allowed only between
static libs, not shared libs).
This is in preparation for supproting BUILD_SHARED_LIBS cmake
built-in option for building internal libs as shared.
This plugs a privacy leak, where the wallet tells the daemon
which transactions contain outputs for the wallet by asking
for additional information for that particular transaction.
As a nice bonus, this actually makes refresh slightly faster.
This plugs a privacy leak from the wallet to the daemon,
as the daemon could previously see what input is included
as a transaction input, which the daemon hadn't previously
supplied. Now, the wallet requests a particular set of
outputs, including the real one.
This can result in transactions that can't be accepted if
the wallet happens to select too many outputs with non standard
unlock times. The daemon could know this and select another
output, but the wallet is blind to it. It's currently very
unlikely since I don't think anything uses non default
unlock times. The wallet requests more outputs than necessary
so it can use spares if any of the returns outputs are still
locked. If there are not enough spares to reach the desired
mixin, the transaction will fail.
This constrains the number of instances of any amount
to the unlocked ones (as defined by the default unlock time
setting: outputs with non default unlock time are not
considered, so may be counted as unlocked even if they are
not actually unlocked).
