From bd27debb2d480845acdd20c4d02509d55fd4f188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sarang Noether <32460187+SarangNoether@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2020 19:37:16 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Bulletproofs+ --- .gitignore | 2 + src/cryptonote_config.h | 2 + src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt | 6 +- src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc | 1135 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h | 49 + src/ringct/rctTypes.h | 33 + tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h | 100 ++ tests/performance_tests/main.cpp | 21 + tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp | 169 +++ 11 files changed, 1517 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc create mode 100644 src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h create mode 100644 tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h create mode 100644 tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 049fc2562..cf7da3a04 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -110,3 +110,5 @@ nbproject /testnet __pycache__/ +*.pyc +*.log diff --git a/src/cryptonote_config.h b/src/cryptonote_config.h index b738960a3..b2919ac20 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_config.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_config.h @@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ namespace config // Hash domain separators const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_EXPONENT[] = "bulletproof"; + const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_EXPONENT[] = "bulletproof_plus"; + const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_TRANSCRIPT[] = "bulletproof_plus_transcript"; const char HASH_KEY_RINGDB[] = "ringdsb"; const char HASH_KEY_SUBADDRESS[] = "SubAddr"; const unsigned char HASH_KEY_ENCRYPTED_PAYMENT_ID = 0x8d; diff --git a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt index 40b2dfd55..32da0f5f5 100644 --- a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt @@ -31,13 +31,15 @@ set(ringct_basic_sources rctTypes.cpp rctCryptoOps.c multiexp.cc - bulletproofs.cc) + bulletproofs.cc + bulletproofs_plus.cc) set(ringct_basic_private_headers rctOps.h rctTypes.h multiexp.h - bulletproofs.h) + bulletproofs.h + bulletproofs_plus.h) monero_private_headers(ringct_basic ${crypto_private_headers}) diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a286ed90 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc @@ -0,0 +1,1135 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +// Implements the Bulletproofs+ prover and verifier algorithms +// +// Preprint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/735, version 17 Jun 2020 +// +// NOTE ON NOTATION: +// In the signature constructions used in Monero, commitments to zero are treated as +// public keys against the curve group generator `G`. This means that amount +// commitments must use another generator `H` for values in order to show balance. +// The result is that the roles of `g` and `h` in the preprint are effectively swapped +// in this code, taking on the roles of `H` and `G`, respectively. Read carefully! + +#include +#include +#include +#include "misc_log_ex.h" +#include "span.h" +#include "cryptonote_config.h" +extern "C" +{ +#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h" +} +#include "rctOps.h" +#include "multiexp.h" +#include "bulletproofs_plus.h" + +#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY +#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "bulletproof_plus" + +#define STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT 232 +#define PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT 0 + +namespace rct +{ + // Vector functions + static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b); + static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n); + + // Proof bounds + static constexpr size_t maxN = 64; // maximum number of bits in range + static constexpr size_t maxM = BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS; // maximum number of outputs to aggregate into a single proof + + // Cached public generators + static rct::key Hi[maxN*maxM], Gi[maxN*maxM]; + static ge_p3 Hi_p3[maxN*maxM], Gi_p3[maxN*maxM]; + static std::shared_ptr straus_HiGi_cache; + static std::shared_ptr pippenger_HiGi_cache; + + // Useful scalar constants + static const rct::key ZERO = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 0 + static const rct::key ONE = { {0x01, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 1 + static const rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 2 + static const rct::key MINUS_ONE = { { 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 } }; // -1 + static const rct::key MINUS_INV_EIGHT = { { 0x74, 0xa4, 0x19, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x05, 0xc2, 0xda, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a } }; // -(8**(-1)) + static rct::key TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE; // 2**64 - 1 + + static boost::mutex init_mutex; + + // Use the generator caches to compute a multiscalar multiplication + static inline rct::key multiexp(const std::vector &data, size_t HiGi_size) + { + if (HiGi_size > 0) + { + static_assert(232 <= STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT, "Straus in precalc mode can only be calculated till STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT"); + return HiGi_size <= 232 && data.size() == HiGi_size ? straus(data, straus_HiGi_cache, 0) : pippenger(data, pippenger_HiGi_cache, HiGi_size, get_pippenger_c(data.size())); + } + else + { + return data.size() <= 95 ? straus(data, NULL, 0) : pippenger(data, NULL, 0, get_pippenger_c(data.size())); + } + } + + // Confirm that a scalar is properly reduced + static inline bool is_reduced(const rct::key &scalar) + { + return sc_check(scalar.bytes) == 0; + } + + // Use hashed values to produce indexed public generators + static rct::key get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx) + { + static const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_EXPONENT); + std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + domain_separator + tools::get_varint_data(idx); + rct::key generator; + ge_p3 generator_p3; + rct::hash_to_p3(generator_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size()))); + ge_p3_tobytes(generator.bytes, &generator_p3); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(generator == rct::identity()), "Exponent is point at infinity"); + return generator; + } + + // Construct public generators + static void init_exponents() + { + boost::lock_guard lock(init_mutex); + + // Only needs to be done once + static bool init_done = false; + if (init_done) + return; + + std::vector data; + data.reserve(maxN*maxM*2); + for (size_t i = 0; i < maxN*maxM; ++i) + { + Hi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Hi_p3[i], Hi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed"); + Gi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Gi_p3[i], Gi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed"); + + data.push_back({rct::zero(), Gi_p3[i]}); + data.push_back({rct::zero(), Hi_p3[i]}); + } + + straus_HiGi_cache = straus_init_cache(data, STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT); + pippenger_HiGi_cache = pippenger_init_cache(data, 0, PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT); + + // Compute 2**64 - 1 for later use in simplifying verification + TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE = TWO; + for (size_t i = 0; i < 6; i++) + { + sc_mul(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes); + } + sc_sub(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, ONE.bytes); + + init_done = true; + } + + // Given two scalar arrays, construct a vector pre-commitment: + // + // a = (a_0, ..., a_{n-1}) + // b = (b_0, ..., b_{n-1}) + // + // Outputs a_0*Gi_0 + ... + a_{n-1}*Gi_{n-1} + + // b_0*Hi_0 + ... + b_{n-1}*Hi_{n-1} + static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() <= maxN*maxM, "Incompatible sizes of a and maxN"); + + std::vector multiexp_data; + multiexp_data.reserve(a.size()*2); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + multiexp_data.emplace_back(a[i], Gi_p3[i]); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(b[i], Hi_p3[i]); + } + return multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * a.size()); + } + + // Helper function used to compute the L and R terms used in the inner-product round function + static rct::key compute_LR(size_t size, const rct::key &y, const std::vector &G, size_t G0, const std::vector &H, size_t H0, const rct::keyV &a, size_t a0, const rct::keyV &b, size_t b0, const rct::key &c, const rct::key &d) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + G0 <= G.size(), "Incompatible size for G"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + H0 <= H.size(), "Incompatible size for H"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + a0 <= a.size(), "Incompatible size for a"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + b0 <= b.size(), "Incompatible size for b"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size <= maxN*maxM, "size is too large"); + + std::vector multiexp_data; + multiexp_data.resize(size*2 + 2); + rct::key temp; + for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[a0+i].bytes, y.bytes); + sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + multiexp_data[i*2].point = G[G0+i]; + + sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2+1].scalar.bytes, b[b0+i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + multiexp_data[i*2+1].point = H[H0+i]; + } + + sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size].scalar.bytes, c.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + ge_p3 H_p3; + ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes); + multiexp_data[2*size].point = H_p3; + + sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size+1].scalar.bytes, d.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + ge_p3 G_p3; + ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes); + multiexp_data[2*size+1].point = G_p3; + + return multiexp(multiexp_data, 0); + } + + // Given a scalar, construct a vector of its powers: + // + // Output (1,x,x**2,...,x**{n-1}) + static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n) + { + rct::keyV res(n); + if (n == 0) + return res; + res[0] = rct::identity(); + if (n == 1) + return res; + res[1] = x; + for (size_t i = 2; i < n; ++i) + { + sc_mul(res[i].bytes, res[i-1].bytes, x.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Given a scalar, construct the sum of its powers from 2 to n (where n is a power of 2): + // + // Output x**2 + x**4 + x**6 + ... + x**n + static rct::key sum_of_even_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((n & (n - 1)) == 0, "Need n to be a power of 2"); + + rct::key x1 = copy(x); + sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes); + + rct::key res = copy(x1); + while (n > 2) + { + sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes); + sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes); + n /= 2; + } + + return res; + } + + // Given a scalar, return the sum of its powers from 1 to n + // + // Output x**1 + x**2 + x**3 + ... + x**n + static rct::key sum_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n) + { + rct::key res = ONE; + if (n == 1) + return res; + + n += 1; + rct::key x1 = copy(x); + + const bool is_power_of_2 = (n & (n - 1)) == 0; + if (is_power_of_2) + { + sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, x1.bytes); + while (n > 2) + { + sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes); + sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes); + n /= 2; + } + } + else + { + rct::key prev = x1; + for (size_t i = 1; i < n; ++i) + { + if (i > 1) + sc_mul(prev.bytes, prev.bytes, x1.bytes); + sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, prev.bytes); + } + } + sc_sub(res.bytes, res.bytes, ONE.bytes); + + return res; + } + + // Given two scalar arrays, construct the weighted inner product against another scalar + // + // Output a_0*b_0*y**1 + a_1*b_1*y**2 + ... + a_{n-1}*b_{n-1}*y**n + static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const epee::span &a, const epee::span &b, const rct::key &y) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::key res = rct::zero(); + rct::key y_power = ONE; + rct::key temp; + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + sc_mul(y_power.bytes, y_power.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_muladd(res.bytes, temp.bytes, y_power.bytes, res.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const epee::span &b, const rct::key &y) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::key res = rct::zero(); + rct::key y_power = ONE; + rct::key temp; + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + sc_mul(y_power.bytes, y_power.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_muladd(res.bytes, temp.bytes, y_power.bytes, res.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Fold inner-product point vectors + static void hadamard_fold(std::vector &v, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((v.size() & 1) == 0, "Vector size should be even"); + const size_t sz = v.size() / 2; + for (size_t n = 0; n < sz; ++n) + { + ge_dsmp c[2]; + ge_dsm_precomp(c[0], &v[n]); + ge_dsm_precomp(c[1], &v[sz + n]); + ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime2_p3(&v[n], a.bytes, c[0], b.bytes, c[1]); + } + v.resize(sz); + } + + // Add vectors componentwise + static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Add a scalar to all elements of a vector + static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b) + { + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Subtract a scalar from all elements of a vector + static rct::keyV vector_subtract(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b) + { + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_sub(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Multiply a scalar by all elements of a vector + static rct::keyV vector_scalar(const epee::span &a, const rct::key &x) + { + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_mul(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, x.bytes); + } + return res; + } + + // Inversion helper function + static rct::key sm(rct::key y, int n, const rct::key &x) + { + while (n--) + sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, x.bytes); + return y; + } + + // Compute the inverse of a nonzero + static rct::key invert(const rct::key &x) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!"); + rct::key _1, _10, _100, _11, _101, _111, _1001, _1011, _1111; + + _1 = x; + sc_mul(_10.bytes, _1.bytes, _1.bytes); + sc_mul(_100.bytes, _10.bytes, _10.bytes); + sc_mul(_11.bytes, _10.bytes, _1.bytes); + sc_mul(_101.bytes, _10.bytes, _11.bytes); + sc_mul(_111.bytes, _10.bytes, _101.bytes); + sc_mul(_1001.bytes, _10.bytes, _111.bytes); + sc_mul(_1011.bytes, _10.bytes, _1001.bytes); + sc_mul(_1111.bytes, _100.bytes, _1011.bytes); + + rct::key inv; + sc_mul(inv.bytes, _1111.bytes, _1.bytes); + + inv = sm(inv, 123 + 3, _101); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 4, _1001); + inv = sm(inv, 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _101); + inv = sm(inv, 3 + 3, _101); + inv = sm(inv, 3, _111); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 3, _111); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1011); + inv = sm(inv, 6 + 4, _1001); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1001); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _111); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011); + inv = sm(inv, 3, _101); + inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111); + inv = sm(inv, 3, _101); + inv = sm(inv, 1 + 2, _11); + + return inv; + } + + // Invert a batch of scalars, all of which _must_ be nonzero + static rct::keyV invert(rct::keyV x) + { + rct::keyV scratch; + scratch.reserve(x.size()); + + rct::key acc = rct::identity(); + for (size_t n = 0; n < x.size(); ++n) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x[n] == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!"); + scratch.push_back(acc); + if (n == 0) + acc = x[0]; + else + sc_mul(acc.bytes, acc.bytes, x[n].bytes); + } + + acc = invert(acc); + + rct::key tmp; + for (int i = x.size(); i-- > 0; ) + { + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, acc.bytes, x[i].bytes); + sc_mul(x[i].bytes, acc.bytes, scratch[i].bytes); + acc = tmp; + } + + return x; + } + + // Compute the slice of a vector + static epee::span slice(const rct::keyV &a, size_t start, size_t stop) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < a.size(), "Invalid start index"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(stop <= a.size(), "Invalid stop index"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < stop, "Invalid start/stop indices"); + return epee::span(&a[start], stop - start); + } + + // Initialize the Fiat-Shamir transcript + static rct::key transcript_initialize() + { + static const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_TRANSCRIPT); + rct::key transcript; + ge_p3 transcript_p3; + rct::hash_to_p3(transcript_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(domain_separator.data(), domain_separator.size()))); + ge_p3_tobytes(transcript.bytes, &transcript_p3); + return transcript; + } + + // Update the transcript + static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0) + { + rct::key data[2]; + data[0] = transcript; + data[1] = update_0; + rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data)); + return transcript; + } + + static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0, const rct::key &update_1) + { + rct::key data[3]; + data[0] = transcript; + data[1] = update_0; + data[2] = update_1; + rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data)); + return transcript; + } + + // Given a value v [0..2**N) and a mask gamma, construct a range proof + BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &sv, const rct::key &gamma) + { + return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(rct::keyV(1, sv), rct::keyV(1, gamma)); + } + + BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma) + { + return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector(1, v), rct::keyV(1, gamma)); + } + + // Given a set of values v [0..2**N) and masks gamma, construct a range proof + BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &sv, const rct::keyV &gamma) + { + // Sanity check on inputs + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sv.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of sv and gamma"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!sv.empty(), "sv is empty"); + for (const rct::key &sve: sv) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(sve), "Invalid sv input"); + for (const rct::key &g: gamma) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(g), "Invalid gamma input"); + + init_exponents(); + + // Useful proof bounds + // + // N: number of bits in each range (here, 64) + // logN: base-2 logarithm + // M: first power of 2 greater than or equal to the number of range proofs to aggregate + // logM: base-2 logarithm + constexpr size_t logN = 6; // log2(64) + constexpr size_t N = 1< 0; ) + { + if (j < sv.size() && (sv[j][i/8] & (((uint64_t)1)<<(i%8)))) + { + aL[j*N+i] = rct::identity(); + aL8[j*N+i] = INV_EIGHT; + aR[j*N+i] = aR8[j*N+i] = rct::zero(); + } + else + { + aL[j*N+i] = aL8[j*N+i] = rct::zero(); + aR[j*N+i] = MINUS_ONE; + aR8[j*N+i] = MINUS_INV_EIGHT; + } + } + } + +try_again: + // This is a Fiat-Shamir transcript + rct::key transcript = transcript_initialize(); + transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(V)); + + // A + rct::key alpha = rct::skGen(); + rct::key pre_A = vector_exponent(aL8, aR8); + rct::key A; + sc_mul(temp.bytes, alpha.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + rct::addKeys(A, pre_A, rct::scalarmultBase(temp)); + + // Challenges + rct::key y = transcript_update(transcript, A); + if (y == rct::zero()) + { + MINFO("y is 0, trying again"); + goto try_again; + } + rct::key z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(y); + if (z == rct::zero()) + { + MINFO("z is 0, trying again"); + goto try_again; + } + rct::key z_squared; + sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, z.bytes, z.bytes); + + // Windowed vector + // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i + // + // We compute this iteratively in order to reduce scalar operations. + rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero()); + d[0] = z_squared; + for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++) + { + sc_mul(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, TWO.bytes); + } + + for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++) + { + for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++) + { + sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes); + } + } + + rct::keyV y_powers = vector_of_scalar_powers(y, MN+2); + + // Prepare inner product terms + rct::keyV aL1 = vector_subtract(aL, z); + + rct::keyV aR1 = vector_add(aR, z); + rct::keyV d_y(MN); + for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; i++) + { + sc_mul(d_y[i].bytes, d[i].bytes, y_powers[MN-i].bytes); + } + aR1 = vector_add(aR1, d_y); + + rct::key alpha1 = alpha; + temp = ONE; + for (size_t j = 0; j < sv.size(); j++) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_powers[MN+1].bytes, temp.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, gamma[j].bytes); + sc_add(alpha1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, temp2.bytes); + } + + // These are used in the inner product rounds + size_t nprime = MN; + std::vector Gprime(MN); + std::vector Hprime(MN); + rct::keyV aprime(MN); + rct::keyV bprime(MN); + + const rct::key yinv = invert(y); + rct::keyV yinvpow(MN); + yinvpow[0] = ONE; + for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i) + { + Gprime[i] = Gi_p3[i]; + Hprime[i] = Hi_p3[i]; + if (i > 0) + { + sc_mul(yinvpow[i].bytes, yinvpow[i-1].bytes, yinv.bytes); + } + aprime[i] = aL1[i]; + bprime[i] = aR1[i]; + } + rct::keyV L(logMN); + rct::keyV R(logMN); + int round = 0; + + // Inner-product rounds + while (nprime > 1) + { + nprime /= 2; + + rct::key cL = weighted_inner_product(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), y); + rct::key cR = weighted_inner_product(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), y_powers[nprime]), slice(bprime, 0, nprime), y); + + rct::key dL = rct::skGen(); + rct::key dR = rct::skGen(); + + L[round] = compute_LR(nprime, yinvpow[nprime], Gprime, nprime, Hprime, 0, aprime, 0, bprime, nprime, cL, dL); + R[round] = compute_LR(nprime, y_powers[nprime], Gprime, 0, Hprime, nprime, aprime, nprime, bprime, 0, cR, dR); + + const rct::key challenge = transcript_update(transcript, L[round], R[round]); + if (challenge == rct::zero()) + { + MINFO("challenge is 0, trying again"); + goto try_again; + } + + const rct::key challenge_inv = invert(challenge); + + sc_mul(temp.bytes, yinvpow[nprime].bytes, challenge.bytes); + hadamard_fold(Gprime, challenge_inv, temp); + hadamard_fold(Hprime, challenge, challenge_inv); + + sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenge_inv.bytes, y_powers[nprime].bytes); + aprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), challenge), vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), temp)); + bprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(bprime, 0, nprime), challenge_inv), vector_scalar(slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), challenge)); + + rct::key challenge_squared; + sc_mul(challenge_squared.bytes, challenge.bytes, challenge.bytes); + rct::key challenge_squared_inv = invert(challenge_squared); + sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dL.bytes, challenge_squared.bytes, alpha1.bytes); + sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dR.bytes, challenge_squared_inv.bytes, alpha1.bytes); + + ++round; + } + + // Final round computations + rct::key r = rct::skGen(); + rct::key s = rct::skGen(); + rct::key d_ = rct::skGen(); + rct::key eta = rct::skGen(); + + std::vector A1_data; + A1_data.reserve(4); + A1_data.resize(4); + + sc_mul(A1_data[0].scalar.bytes, r.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + A1_data[0].point = Gprime[0]; + + sc_mul(A1_data[1].scalar.bytes, s.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + A1_data[1].point = Hprime[0]; + + sc_mul(A1_data[2].scalar.bytes, d_.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + ge_p3 G_p3; + ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes); + A1_data[2].point = G_p3; + + sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, bprime[0].bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, s.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, aprime[0].bytes); + sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes); + sc_mul(A1_data[3].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + ge_p3 H_p3; + ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes); + A1_data[3].point = H_p3; + + rct::key A1 = multiexp(A1_data, 0); + + sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, s.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, eta.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes); + rct::key B; + rct::addKeys2(B, temp2, temp, rct::H); + + rct::key e = transcript_update(transcript, A1, B); + rct::key e_squared; + sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, e.bytes, e.bytes); + + rct::key r1; + sc_muladd(r1.bytes, aprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, r.bytes); + + rct::key s1; + sc_muladd(s1.bytes, bprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, s.bytes); + + rct::key d1; + sc_muladd(d1.bytes, d_.bytes, e.bytes, eta.bytes); + sc_muladd(d1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, e_squared.bytes, d1.bytes); + + return BulletproofPlus(std::move(V), A, A1, B, r1, s1, d1, std::move(L), std::move(R)); + } + + BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector &v, const rct::keyV &gamma) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(v.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of v and gamma"); + + // vG + gammaH + rct::keyV sv(v.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < v.size(); ++i) + { + sv[i] = rct::zero(); + sv[i].bytes[0] = v[i] & 255; + sv[i].bytes[1] = (v[i] >> 8) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[2] = (v[i] >> 16) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[3] = (v[i] >> 24) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[4] = (v[i] >> 32) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[5] = (v[i] >> 40) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[6] = (v[i] >> 48) & 255; + sv[i].bytes[7] = (v[i] >> 56) & 255; + } + return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(sv, gamma); + } + + struct bp_plus_proof_data_t + { + rct::key y, z, e; + std::vector challenges; + size_t logM, inv_offset; + }; + + // Given a batch of range proofs, determine if they are all valid + bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector &proofs) + { + init_exponents(); + + const size_t logN = 6; + const size_t N = 1 << logN; + + // Set up + size_t max_length = 0; // size of each of the longest proof's inner-product vectors + size_t nV = 0; // number of output commitments across all proofs + size_t inv_offset = 0; + size_t max_logM = 0; + + std::vector proof_data; + proof_data.reserve(proofs.size()); + + // We'll perform only a single batch inversion across all proofs in the batch, + // since batch inversion requires only one scalar inversion operation. + std::vector to_invert; + to_invert.reserve(11 * sizeof(proofs)); // maximal size, given the aggregation limit + + for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs) + { + const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p; + + // Sanity checks + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.r1), false, "Input scalar not in range"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.s1), false, "Input scalar not in range"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.d1), false, "Input scalar not in range"); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() >= 1, false, "V does not have at least one element"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof"); + + max_length = std::max(max_length, proof.L.size()); + nV += proof.V.size(); + + bp_plus_proof_data_t pd; + + // Reconstruct the challenges + rct::key transcript = transcript_initialize(); + transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(proof.V)); + pd.y = transcript_update(transcript, proof.A); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.y == rct::zero()), false, "y == 0"); + pd.z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(pd.y); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.z == rct::zero()), false, "z == 0"); + + // Determine the number of inner-product rounds based on proof size + size_t M; + for (pd.logM = 0; (M = 1< 0, false, "Zero rounds"); + + // The inner-product challenges are computed per round + pd.challenges.resize(rounds); + for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j) + { + pd.challenges[j] = transcript_update(transcript, proof.L[j], proof.R[j]); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.challenges[j] == rct::zero()), false, "challenges[j] == 0"); + } + + // Final challenge + pd.e = transcript_update(transcript,proof.A1,proof.B); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.e == rct::zero()), false, "e == 0"); + + // Batch scalar inversions + pd.inv_offset = inv_offset; + for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j) + to_invert.push_back(pd.challenges[j]); + to_invert.push_back(pd.y); + inv_offset += rounds + 1; + proof_data.push_back(pd); + } + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(max_length < 32, false, "At least one proof is too large"); + size_t maxMN = 1u << max_length; + + rct::key temp; + rct::key temp2; + + // Final batch proof data + std::vector multiexp_data; + multiexp_data.reserve(nV + (2 * (max_logM + logN) + 3) * proofs.size() + 2 * maxMN); + multiexp_data.resize(2 * maxMN); + + const std::vector inverses = invert(to_invert); + + // Weights and aggregates + // + // The idea is to take the single multiscalar multiplication used in the verification + // of each proof in the batch and weight it using a random weighting factor, resulting + // in just one multiscalar multiplication check to zero for the entire batch. + // We can further simplify the verifier complexity by including common group elements + // only once in this single multiscalar multiplication. + // Common group elements' weighted scalar sums are tracked across proofs for this reason. + // + // To build a multiscalar multiplication for each proof, we use the method described in + // Section 6.1 of the preprint. Note that the result given there does not account for + // the construction of the inner-product inputs that are produced in the range proof + // verifier algorithm; we have done so here. + rct::key G_scalar = rct::zero(); + rct::key H_scalar = rct::zero(); + rct::keyV Gi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero()); + rct::keyV Hi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero()); + + int proof_data_index = 0; + rct::keyV challenges_cache; + std::vector proof8_V, proof8_L, proof8_R; + + // Process each proof and add to the weighted batch + for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs) + { + const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p; + const bp_plus_proof_data_t &pd = proof_data[proof_data_index++]; + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+pd.logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size"); + const size_t M = 1 << pd.logM; + const size_t MN = M*N; + + // Random weighting factor must be nonzero, which is exceptionally unlikely! + rct::key weight = ZERO; + while (weight == ZERO) + { + weight = rct::skGen(); + } + + // Rescale previously offset proof elements + // + // This ensures that all such group elements are in the prime-order subgroup. + proof8_V.resize(proof.V.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.V.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_V[i], proof.V[i]); + proof8_L.resize(proof.L.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.L.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_L[i], proof.L[i]); + proof8_R.resize(proof.R.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.R.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_R[i], proof.R[i]); + ge_p3 proof8_A1; + ge_p3 proof8_B; + ge_p3 proof8_A; + rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A1, proof.A1); + rct::scalarmult8(proof8_B, proof.B); + rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A, proof.A); + + // Compute necessary powers of the y-challenge + rct::key y_MN = copy(pd.y); + rct::key y_MN_1; + size_t temp_MN = MN; + while (temp_MN > 1) + { + sc_mul(y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes); + temp_MN /= 2; + } + sc_mul(y_MN_1.bytes, y_MN.bytes, pd.y.bytes); + + // V_j: -e**2 * z**(2*j+1) * y**(MN+1) * weight + rct::key e_squared; + sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, pd.e.bytes, pd.e.bytes); + + rct::key z_squared; + sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes, pd.z.bytes); + + sc_sub(temp.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes); + for (size_t j = 0; j < proof8_V.size(); j++) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_V[j]); + } + + // B: -weight + sc_mul(temp.bytes, MINUS_ONE.bytes, weight.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_B); + + // A1: -weight*e + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_A1); + + // A: -weight*e*e + rct::key minus_weight_e_squared; + sc_mul(minus_weight_e_squared.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(minus_weight_e_squared, proof8_A); + + // G: weight*d1 + sc_muladd(G_scalar.bytes, weight.bytes, proof.d1.bytes, G_scalar.bytes); + + // Windowed vector + // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i + rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero()); + d[0] = z_squared; + for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++) + { + sc_add(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, d[i-1].bytes); + } + + for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++) + { + for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++) + { + sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes); + } + } + + // More efficient computation of sum(d) + rct::key sum_d; + sc_mul(sum_d.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, sum_of_even_powers(pd.z, 2*M).bytes); + + // H: weight*( r1*y*s1 + e**2*( y**(MN+1)*z*sum(d) + (z**2-z)*sum(y) ) ) + rct::key sum_y = sum_of_scalar_powers(pd.y, MN); + sc_sub(temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, sum_y.bytes); + + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes, pd.z.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, sum_d.bytes); + sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, e_squared.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, proof.r1.bytes, pd.y.bytes); + sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, proof.s1.bytes); + sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes); + sc_muladd(H_scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes, H_scalar.bytes); + + // Compute the number of rounds for the inner-product argument + const size_t rounds = pd.logM+logN; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds"); + + const rct::key *challenges_inv = &inverses[pd.inv_offset]; + const rct::key yinv = inverses[pd.inv_offset + rounds]; + + // Compute challenge products + challenges_cache.resize(1< 0; --s) + { + sc_mul(challenges_cache[s].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes); + sc_mul(challenges_cache[s-1].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes); + } + } + + // Gi and Hi + rct::key e_r1_w_y; + sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.r1.bytes); + sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes); + rct::key e_s1_w; + sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.s1.bytes); + sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, weight.bytes); + rct::key e_squared_z_w; + sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes); + sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes, weight.bytes); + rct::key minus_e_squared_z_w; + sc_sub(minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes); + rct::key minus_e_squared_w_y; + sc_sub(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes); + sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes); + sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, y_MN.bytes); + for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i) + { + rct::key g_scalar = copy(e_r1_w_y); + rct::key h_scalar; + + // Use the binary decomposition of the index + sc_muladd(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, challenges_cache[i].bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes); + sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, challenges_cache[(~i) & (MN-1)].bytes, minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes); + + // Complete the scalar derivation + sc_add(Gi_scalars[i].bytes, Gi_scalars[i].bytes, g_scalar.bytes); + sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, d[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes); + sc_add(Hi_scalars[i].bytes, Hi_scalars[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes); + + // Update iterated values + sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes); + sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes); + } + + // L_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**2 + // R_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**(-2) + for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j) + { + sc_mul(temp.bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_L[j]); + + sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes); + sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_R[j]); + } + } + + // Verify all proofs in the weighted batch + multiexp_data.emplace_back(G_scalar, rct::G); + multiexp_data.emplace_back(H_scalar, rct::H); + for (size_t i = 0; i < maxMN; ++i) + { + multiexp_data[i * 2] = {Gi_scalars[i], Gi_p3[i]}; + multiexp_data[i * 2 + 1] = {Hi_scalars[i], Hi_p3[i]}; + } + if (!(multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * maxMN) == rct::identity())) + { + MERROR("Verification failure"); + return false; + } + + return true; + } + + bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector &proofs) + { + std::vector proof_pointers; + proof_pointers.reserve(proofs.size()); + for (const BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs) + proof_pointers.push_back(&proof); + return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof_pointers); + } + + bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof) + { + std::vector proofs; + proofs.push_back(&proof); + return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs); + } +} diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d9084075a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +#pragma once + +#ifndef BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H +#define BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H + +#include "rctTypes.h" + +namespace rct +{ + +BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &v, const rct::key &gamma); +BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma); +BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &v, const rct::keyV &gamma); +BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector &v, const rct::keyV &gamma); +bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof); +bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector &proofs); +bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector &proofs); + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h index 278ff4164..dc69990f0 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h @@ -238,6 +238,39 @@ namespace rct { END_SERIALIZE() }; + struct BulletproofPlus + { + rct::keyV V; + rct::key A, A1, B; + rct::key r1, s1, d1; + rct::keyV L, R; + + BulletproofPlus(): + A({}), A1({}), B({}), r1({}), s1({}), d1({}) {} + BulletproofPlus(const rct::key &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R): + V({V}), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {} + BulletproofPlus(const rct::keyV &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R): + V(V), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {} + + bool operator==(const BulletproofPlus &other) const { return V == other.V && A == other.A && A1 == other.A1 && B == other.B && r1 == other.r1 && s1 == other.s1 && d1 == other.d1 && L == other.L && R == other.R; } + + BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT() + // Commitments aren't saved, they're restored via outPk + // FIELD(V) + FIELD(A) + FIELD(A1) + FIELD(B) + FIELD(r1) + FIELD(s1) + FIELD(d1) + FIELD(L) + FIELD(R) + + if (L.empty() || L.size() != R.size()) + return false; + END_SERIALIZE() + }; + size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof); size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof); size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector &proofs); diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt index 542d204e0..e8810ff85 100644 --- a/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ set(performance_tests_headers subaddress_expand.h range_proof.h bulletproof.h + bulletproof_plus.h crypto_ops.h sc_reduce32.h sc_check.h diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h b/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b436e5e12 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2014-2020, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers + +#pragma once + +#include "ringct/rctSigs.h" +#include "ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h" + +template +class test_bulletproof_plus +{ +public: + static const size_t approx_loop_count = 100 / n_amounts; + static const size_t loop_count = (approx_loop_count >= 10 ? approx_loop_count : 10) / (a_verify ? 1 : 5); + static const bool verify = a_verify; + + bool init() + { + proof = rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector(n_amounts, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(n_amounts)); + return true; + } + + bool test() + { + bool ret = true; + if (verify) + ret = rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof); + else + rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector(n_amounts, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(n_amounts)); + return ret; + } + +private: + rct::BulletproofPlus proof; +}; + +template +class test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus +{ +public: + static const size_t loop_count = 500 / (N * repeat); + + bool init() + { + size_t o = start; + for (size_t n = 0; n < N; ++n) + { + //printf("adding %zu times %zu\n", repeat, o); + for (size_t i = 0; i < repeat; ++i) + proofs.push_back(rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector(o, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(o))); + o = o * mul + add; + } + return true; + } + + bool test() + { + if (batch) + { + return rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs); + } + else + { + for (const rct::BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs) + if (!rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)) + return false; + return true; + } + } + +private: + std::vector proofs; +}; diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp b/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp index e59bb52fd..a61d84bed 100644 --- a/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp +++ b/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include "equality.h" #include "range_proof.h" #include "bulletproof.h" +#include "bulletproof_plus.h" #include "crypto_ops.h" #include "multiexp.h" #include "sig_mlsag.h" @@ -241,6 +242,26 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_range_proof, true); TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_range_proof, false); + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 1); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 1 amount + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 1); + + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 2); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 2 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 2); + + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 15); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 15 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 15); + + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 2, 1, 1, 0, 4); + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 2, 1, 1, 0, 4); // 4 proofs, each with 2 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 8, 1, 1, 0, 4); + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 8, 1, 1, 0, 4); // 4 proofs, each with 8 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 1, 1, 2, 0, 4); + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 1, 1, 2, 0, 4); // 4 proofs with 1, 2, 4, 8 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 1, 8, 1, 1, 4); + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 1, 8, 1, 1, 4); // 32 proofs, with 1, 2, 3, 4 amounts, 8 of each + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64); + TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64); // 64 proof, each with 2 amounts + TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof, true, 1); // 1 bulletproof with 1 amount TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof, false, 1); diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt index 556e0ec40..5f6b1e749 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ set(unit_tests_sources block_reward.cpp bootstrap_node_selector.cpp bulletproofs.cpp + bulletproofs_plus.cpp canonical_amounts.cpp chacha.cpp checkpoints.cpp diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a64320233 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers + +#include "gtest/gtest.h" + +#include "string_tools.h" +#include "ringct/rctOps.h" +#include "ringct/rctSigs.h" +#include "ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h" +#include "cryptonote_basic/blobdatatype.h" +#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h" +#include "device/device.hpp" +#include "misc_log_ex.h" + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_zero) +{ + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(0, rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_max) +{ + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(0xffffffffffffffff, rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_random) +{ + for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n) + { + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(crypto::rand(), rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + } +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_multi_random) +{ + for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n) + { + size_t outputs = 2 + n; + std::vector amounts; + rct::keyV gamma; + for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i) + { + amounts.push_back(crypto::rand()); + gamma.push_back(rct::skGen()); + } + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(amounts, gamma); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + } +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_aggregated) +{ + static const size_t N_PROOFS = 8; + std::vector proofs(N_PROOFS); + for (size_t n = 0; n < N_PROOFS; ++n) + { + size_t outputs = 2 + n; + std::vector amounts; + rct::keyV gamma; + for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i) + { + amounts.push_back(crypto::rand()); + gamma.push_back(rct::skGen()); + } + proofs[n] = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(amounts, gamma); + } + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs)); +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_8) +{ + rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero(); + invalid_amount[8] = 1; + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); +} + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_31) +{ + rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero(); + invalid_amount[31] = 1; + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); +} + +static const char * const torsion_elements[] = +{ + "c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa", + "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc85", + "ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f", + "26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc05", + "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080", + "c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac037a", +}; + +TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_torsion) +{ + rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(7329838943733, rct::skGen()); + ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + for (const auto &xs: torsion_elements) + { + rct::key x; + ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(xs, x)); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::isInMainSubgroup(x)); + for (auto &k: proof.V) + { + const rct::key org_k = k; + rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + k = org_k; + } + for (auto &k: proof.L) + { + const rct::key org_k = k; + rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + k = org_k; + } + for (auto &k: proof.R) + { + const rct::key org_k = k; + rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + k = org_k; + } + const rct::key org_A = proof.A; + rct::addKeys(proof.A, org_A, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + proof.A = org_A; + const rct::key org_A1 = proof.A1; + rct::addKeys(proof.A1, org_A1, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + proof.A1 = org_A1; + const rct::key org_B = proof.B; + rct::addKeys(proof.B, org_B, x); + ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof)); + proof.B = org_B; + } +}