Integrate CLSAGs into monero

They are allowed from v12, and MLSAGs are rejected from v13.
This commit is contained in:
moneromooo-monero 2019-06-09 13:02:16 +00:00
parent 8cd1d6df8f
commit 82ee01699c
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 686F07454D6CEFC3
31 changed files with 1083 additions and 195 deletions

View file

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
#include "ringct/rctOps.h"
#include "device/device.hpp"
#include "string_tools.h"
using namespace std;
using namespace crypto;
@ -137,6 +138,169 @@ TEST(ringct, MG_sigs)
ASSERT_FALSE(MLSAG_Ver(message, P, IIccss, R));
}
TEST(ringct, CLSAG)
{
const size_t ring_size = 11;
const size_t idx = 5;
keyV P, C;
key p, z;
const key message = identity();
key backup;
clsag clsag;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ring_size; ++i)
{
key Sk, Pk;
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
P.push_back(Pk);
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
C.push_back(Pk);
}
skpkGen(p, P[idx]);
skpkGen(z, C[idx]);
// bad p at creation
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(zero(), P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
// bad index at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, (idx + 1) % ring_size); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad z at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, skGen(), idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad C at creation
backup = C[idx];
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
C[idx] = backup;
// bad p at creation
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, skGen(), C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
// bad P at creation
backup = P[idx];
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
try
{
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
P[idx] = backup;
// good
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
// bad message at verification
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
// bad real P at verification
backup = P[idx];
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
P[idx] = backup;
// bad fake P at verification
backup = P[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
// bad real C at verification
backup = C[idx];
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
C[idx] = backup;
// bad fake C at verification
backup = C[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
// empty s
auto sbackup = clsag.s;
clsag.s.clear();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.s = sbackup;
// too few s elements
backup = clsag.s.back();
clsag.s.pop_back();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.s.push_back(backup);
// too many s elements
clsag.s.push_back(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.s.pop_back();
// bad s in clsag at verification
for (auto &s: clsag.s)
{
backup = s;
s = skGen();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
s = backup;
}
// bad c1 in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.c1;
clsag.c1 = skGen();
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.c1 = backup;
// bad I in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.I;
clsag.I = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.I = backup;
// bad D in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.D;
clsag.D = scalarmultBase(skGen());
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.D = backup;
// D not in main subgroup in clsag at verification
backup = clsag.D;
rct::key x;
ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod("c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa", x));
clsag.D = rct::addKeys(clsag.D, x);
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
clsag.D = backup;
// swapped I and D in clsag at verification
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
// check it's still good, in case we failed to restore
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
}
TEST(ringct, range_proofs)
{
//Ring CT Stuff