From 74a465c83e95659890e05f7507a1ead3f4af3928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: anonimal Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2017 22:00:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Repo: remove in-tree VRP, link to single-policy VRP --- README.md | 5 ++ VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md | 143 ------------------------------ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 3f9b772d1..e23f29df1 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ Portions Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Cryptonote developers - GitHub: [https://github.com/monero-project/monero](https://github.com/monero-project/monero) - IRC: [#monero-dev on Freenode](http://webchat.freenode.net/?randomnick=1&channels=%23monero-dev&prompt=1&uio=d4) +## Vulnerability Response + +- Our [Vulnerability Response Process](https://github.com/monero-project/meta/blob/master/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md) encourages responsible disclosure +- We are also available via [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero) + ## Build | Operating System | Processor | Status | diff --git a/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md b/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md deleted file mode 100644 index eea3a06e7..000000000 --- a/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -# Monero Vulnerability Response Process - -## Preamble - -Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following: -- Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the network -- Social Engineering of Monero staff or contractors -- Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero community property and/or data centers - -## I. Point of Contacts for Security Issues - -``` -ric@getmonero.org -BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9 759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9 - -luigi1111@getmonero.org -8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2 F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010 - -moneromooo.monero@gmail.com -48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3 -``` - -## II. Security Response Team - -- fluffypony -- luigi1111 -- moneromooo - -## III. Incident Response - -1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods: - - a. Email - - b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero) - -2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set - -3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels - -4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability - - a. If submission proves to be vulnerable, proceed to next step - - b. If not vulnerable: - - i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability - - ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary - -5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission - -6. Establish severity of vulnerability: - - a. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe - - b. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, wallets, or must be carefully exploited - - c. LOW: is not easily exploitable - -7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability: - - a. HIGH severities must be notified on website and reddit /r/Monero within 3 working days of classification - - i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any - - ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path - - iii. The latter takes precedence over the former - - b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release - - c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release - -8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es) - - a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in - - b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher - - c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits - - d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted - - i. Include the severity of the vulnerability - - ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code - - iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied - - e. Release date is discussed - -9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update: - - a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk - - b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes - - c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release - -## IV. Post-release Disclosure Process - -1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III - -2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed: - - a. Response Manager contacts researcher and asks if researcher wishes for credit - - b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following: - - i. Project name and URL - - ii. Versions known to be affected - - iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected) - - iv. Versions not checked - - v. Type of vulnerability and its impact - - vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID - - vii. The planned, coordinated release date - - viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations) - - ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability) - - x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter - - c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on website and reddit /r/Monero - - d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists: - - i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com - - ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com - - e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID - - i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID - -3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed: - - a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future - - b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V - - c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus - - d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public - -## V. Incident Analysis - -1. Isolate codebase - - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following: - - i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc. - - ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc. - - iii. Operator/config error, etc. - -2. Auditing - - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following: - - i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1 - - ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference - - iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub - -3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V - -## VI. Resolutions - -Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following: - -- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/) -- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero) -- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/) -- IRC -- Email - -## VII. Continuous Improvement - -1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents - -2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including: - - a. Areas of Monero affected by the incidents - - b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents - - c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any) - - d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents - -3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss: - - a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents - - b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses