wownero/src/ringct/rctTypes.h

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// Copyright (c) 2016, Monero Research Labs
//
// Author: Shen Noether <shen.noether@gmx.com>
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#pragma once
#ifndef RCT_TYPES_H
#define RCT_TYPES_H
#include <cstddef>
#include <vector>
#include <iostream>
#include <cinttypes>
#include <sodium/crypto_verify_32.h>
extern "C" {
#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "crypto/keccak.h"
}
#include "crypto/generic-ops.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "hex.h"
#include "span.h"
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#include "serialization/vector.h"
#include "serialization/debug_archive.h"
#include "serialization/binary_archive.h"
#include "serialization/json_archive.h"
//Define this flag when debugging to get additional info on the console
#ifdef DBG
#define DP(x) dp(x)
#else
#define DP(x)
#endif
//atomic units of moneros
#define ATOMS 64
//for printing large ints
//Namespace specifically for ring ct code
namespace rct {
//basic ops containers
typedef unsigned char * Bytes;
// Can contain a secret or public key
// similar to secret_key / public_key of crypto-ops,
// but uses unsigned chars,
// also includes an operator for accessing the i'th byte.
struct key {
unsigned char & operator[](int i) {
return bytes[i];
}
unsigned char operator[](int i) const {
return bytes[i];
}
bool operator==(const key &k) const { return !crypto_verify_32(bytes, k.bytes); }
unsigned char bytes[32];
};
typedef std::vector<key> keyV; //vector of keys
typedef std::vector<keyV> keyM; //matrix of keys (indexed by column first)
//containers For CT operations
//if it's representing a private ctkey then "dest" contains the secret key of the address
// while "mask" contains a where C = aG + bH is CT pedersen commitment and b is the amount
// (store b, the amount, separately
//if it's representing a public ctkey, then "dest" = P the address, mask = C the commitment
struct ctkey {
key dest;
key mask; //C here if public
};
typedef std::vector<ctkey> ctkeyV;
typedef std::vector<ctkeyV> ctkeyM;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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//used for multisig data
struct multisig_kLRki {
key k;
key L;
key R;
key ki;
};
struct multisig_out {
std::vector<key> c; // for all inputs
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(c)
END_SERIALIZE()
};
//data for passing the amount to the receiver secretly
// If the pedersen commitment to an amount is C = aG + bH,
// "mask" contains a 32 byte key a
// "amount" contains a hex representation (in 32 bytes) of a 64 bit number
// "senderPk" is not the senders actual public key, but a one-time public key generated for
// the purpose of the ECDH exchange
struct ecdhTuple {
key mask;
key amount;
key senderPk;
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(mask)
FIELD(amount)
// FIELD(senderPk) // not serialized, as we do not use it in monero currently
END_SERIALIZE()
};
//containers for representing amounts
typedef uint64_t xmr_amount;
typedef unsigned int bits[ATOMS];
typedef key key64[64];
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struct boroSig {
key64 s0;
key64 s1;
key ee;
};
//Container for precomp
struct geDsmp {
ge_dsmp k;
};
//just contains the necessary keys to represent MLSAG sigs
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//c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098
struct mgSig {
keyM ss;
key cc;
keyV II;
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(ss)
FIELD(cc)
// FIELD(II) - not serialized, it can be reconstructed
END_SERIALIZE()
};
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//contains the data for an Borromean sig
// also contains the "Ci" values such that
// \sum Ci = C
// and the signature proves that each Ci is either
// a Pedersen commitment to 0 or to 2^i
//thus proving that C is in the range of [0, 2^64]
struct rangeSig {
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boroSig asig;
key64 Ci;
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(asig)
FIELD(Ci)
END_SERIALIZE()
};
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struct Bulletproof
{
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rct::keyV V;
rct::key A, S, T1, T2;
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rct::key taux, mu;
rct::keyV L, R;
rct::key a, b, t;
Bulletproof() {}
Bulletproof(const rct::key &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &S, const rct::key &T1, const rct::key &T2, const rct::key &taux, const rct::key &mu, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b, const rct::key &t):
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V({V}), A(A), S(S), T1(T1), T2(T2), taux(taux), mu(mu), L(L), R(R), a(a), b(b), t(t) {}
Bulletproof(const rct::keyV &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &S, const rct::key &T1, const rct::key &T2, const rct::key &taux, const rct::key &mu, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b, const rct::key &t):
V(V), A(A), S(S), T1(T1), T2(T2), taux(taux), mu(mu), L(L), R(R), a(a), b(b), t(t) {}
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BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
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// Commitments aren't saved, they're restored via outPk
// FIELD(V)
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FIELD(A)
FIELD(S)
FIELD(T1)
FIELD(T2)
FIELD(taux)
FIELD(mu)
FIELD(L)
FIELD(R)
FIELD(a)
FIELD(b)
FIELD(t)
if (L.empty() || L.size() != R.size())
return false;
END_SERIALIZE()
};
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
//A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT
// rangeSigs holds all the rangeproof data of a transaction
// MG holds the MLSAG signature of a transaction
// mixRing holds all the public keypairs (P, C) for a transaction
// ecdhInfo holds an encoded mask / amount to be passed to each receiver
// outPk contains public keypairs which are destinations (P, C),
// P = address, C = commitment to amount
enum {
RCTTypeNull = 0,
RCTTypeFull = 1,
RCTTypeSimple = 2,
RCTTypeBulletproof = 3,
};
enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, RangeProofPaddedBulletproof };
struct rctSigBase {
uint8_t type;
key message;
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ctkeyM mixRing; //the set of all pubkeys / copy
//pairs that you mix with
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keyV pseudoOuts; //C - for simple rct
std::vector<ecdhTuple> ecdhInfo;
ctkeyV outPk;
xmr_amount txnFee; // contains b
template<bool W, template <bool> class Archive>
bool serialize_rctsig_base(Archive<W> &ar, size_t inputs, size_t outputs)
{
FIELD(type)
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
return true;
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
return false;
VARINT_FIELD(txnFee)
// inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help
// FIELD(message) - not serialized, it can be reconstructed
// FIELD(mixRing) - not serialized, it can be reconstructed
if (type == RCTTypeSimple) // moved to prunable with bulletproofs
{
ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
ar.begin_array();
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(inputs, pseudoOuts);
if (pseudoOuts.size() != inputs)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < inputs; ++i)
{
FIELDS(pseudoOuts[i])
if (inputs - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
}
ar.tag("ecdhInfo");
ar.begin_array();
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, ecdhInfo);
if (ecdhInfo.size() != outputs)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
{
FIELDS(ecdhInfo[i])
if (outputs - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
ar.tag("outPk");
ar.begin_array();
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, outPk);
if (outPk.size() != outputs)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
{
FIELDS(outPk[i].mask)
if (outputs - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
return true;
}
};
struct rctSigPrunable {
std::vector<rangeSig> rangeSigs;
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std::vector<Bulletproof> bulletproofs;
std::vector<mgSig> MGs; // simple rct has N, full has 1
keyV pseudoOuts; //C - for simple rct
template<bool W, template <bool> class Archive>
bool serialize_rctsig_prunable(Archive<W> &ar, uint8_t type, size_t inputs, size_t outputs, size_t mixin)
{
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
return true;
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
return false;
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
{
uint32_t nbp = bulletproofs.size();
FIELD(nbp)
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ar.tag("bp");
ar.begin_array();
if (nbp > outputs)
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return false;
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(nbp, bulletproofs);
for (size_t i = 0; i < nbp; ++i)
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{
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FIELDS(bulletproofs[i])
if (nbp - i > 1)
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ar.delimit_array();
}
if (n_bulletproof_max_amounts(bulletproofs) < outputs)
return false;
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ar.end_array();
}
else
{
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ar.tag("rangeSigs");
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ar.begin_array();
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PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, rangeSigs);
if (rangeSigs.size() != outputs)
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return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
{
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FIELDS(rangeSigs[i])
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if (outputs - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
}
ar.tag("MGs");
ar.begin_array();
// we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is
// a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me
size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs);
if (MGs.size() != mg_elements)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mg_elements; ++i)
{
// we save the MGs contents directly, because we want it to save its
// arrays and matrices without the size prefixes, and the load can't
// know what size to expect if it's not in the data
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ar.begin_object();
ar.tag("ss");
ar.begin_array();
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mixin + 1, MGs[i].ss);
if (MGs[i].ss.size() != mixin + 1)
return false;
for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j)
{
ar.begin_array();
size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]);
if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements)
return false;
for (size_t k = 0; k < mg_ss2_elements; ++k)
{
FIELDS(MGs[i].ss[j][k])
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if (mg_ss2_elements - k > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
if (mixin + 1 - j > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
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ar.tag("cc");
FIELDS(MGs[i].cc)
// MGs[i].II not saved, it can be reconstructed
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ar.end_object();
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if (mg_elements - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
{
ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
ar.begin_array();
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(inputs, pseudoOuts);
if (pseudoOuts.size() != inputs)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < inputs; ++i)
{
FIELDS(pseudoOuts[i])
if (inputs - i > 1)
ar.delimit_array();
}
ar.end_array();
}
return true;
}
};
struct rctSig: public rctSigBase {
rctSigPrunable p;
keyV& get_pseudo_outs()
{
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
}
keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const
{
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
}
};
//other basepoint H = toPoint(cn_fast_hash(G)), G the basepoint
static const key H = { {0x8b, 0x65, 0x59, 0x70, 0x15, 0x37, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x2a, 0xea, 0xdc, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0xad, 0xd0, 0xea, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x51, 0xd5, 0x41, 0x54, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x2c, 0x17, 0x3a, 0x0d, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x94} };
//H2 contains 2^i H in each index, i.e. H, 2H, 4H, 8H, ...
//This is used for the range proofG
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//You can regenerate this by running python2 Test.py HPow2 in the MiniNero repo
static const key64 H2 = {{{0x8b, 0x65, 0x59, 0x70, 0x15, 0x37, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x2a, 0xea, 0xdc, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0xad, 0xd0, 0xea, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x51, 0xd5, 0x41, 0x54, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x2c, 0x17, 0x3a, 0x0d, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x94}},
{{0x8f, 0xaa, 0x44, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xb3, 0xe2, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x13, 0x09, 0x09, 0xf5, 0x5f, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x71, 0x1c, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xcd, 0xbc, 0xca, 0xdd, 0x42, 0xcb, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x5e, 0x87, 0x12}},
{{0x12, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x2c, 0x77, 0x91, 0x65, 0x4a, 0x57, 0xf3, 0xe6, 0x76, 0x94, 0xed, 0x50, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0x7d, 0x9e, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa0, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x7e, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0x1d}},
{{0x78, 0x9a, 0xb9, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x49, 0xc4, 0xf9, 0xe6, 0x78, 0x5c, 0x6d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0x98, 0xb3, 0xea, 0xd4, 0x43, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x13, 0xdf, 0x11, 0x0c, 0x54, 0x27, 0xb4, 0xf2, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x39}},
{{0x77, 0x1e, 0x92, 0x99, 0xd9, 0x4f, 0x02, 0xac, 0x72, 0xe3, 0x8e, 0x44, 0xde, 0x56, 0x8a, 0xc1, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0xed, 0xc6, 0xed, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0x83, 0xca, 0x41, 0x8e, 0x10, 0x77, 0xce, 0x3d, 0xe8}},
{{0x73, 0xb9, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0x30, 0x39, 0x81, 0x9b, 0xda, 0xf5, 0x68, 0x0e, 0x5c, 0x32, 0xd7, 0x41, 0x48, 0x88, 0x84, 0xd1, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x86, 0x6d, 0x40, 0x74, 0xa8, 0x49, 0x18, 0x2a, 0x8a, 0x64}},
{{0x8d, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x2f, 0x68, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0xcc, 0xd2, 0xfd, 0x5d, 0x37, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0x58, 0xf8, 0x13, 0x4d, 0xf3, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x8c, 0xad, 0x3d, 0x46, 0x70, 0x10, 0x63, 0xa8, 0xd4, 0x12}},
{{0x09, 0x55, 0x1e, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x94, 0x41, 0x8e, 0x81, 0x28, 0x44, 0x55, 0xd6, 0x4b, 0x35, 0xee, 0x8a, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x06, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0x16, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0x63, 0x75, 0x59, 0x17, 0x7e, 0xf4, 0x04}},
{{0xd0, 0x5a, 0x88, 0x66, 0xf4, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x26, 0x8b, 0x1d, 0x23, 0xa4, 0xc5, 0x8c, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x60, 0x30, 0x97, 0x86, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x0f, 0xed, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x47, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0xa7}},
{{0x55, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0xd5, 0x18, 0xbd, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x1d, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0xf3, 0x33, 0x98, 0x64, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0xdd, 0x2d, 0xe2, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x2d}},
{{0xe7, 0x69, 0x7e, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x98, 0xcf, 0xd5, 0x71, 0x2b, 0x84, 0xbb, 0xe5, 0xf3, 0x4e, 0xd7, 0x33, 0xe9, 0x47, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x68, 0xed, 0xa6, 0x6e, 0x37, 0x88, 0xdf, 0x19, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x06}},
{{0xf9, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x0b, 0xae, 0x72, 0x78, 0x29, 0x89, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xaa, 0x92, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x9c, 0x7e, 0x95, 0x91, 0x8b, 0x3b, 0xba, 0x3c, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0xe8, 0x8a, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x47}},
{{0x1f, 0x66, 0xc2, 0xd4, 0x91, 0xd7, 0x5a, 0xf9, 0x15, 0xc8, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0x6d, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0xcd, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0xd5, 0xe6, 0x3d, 0x3b, 0xa9, 0xb8, 0x3c, 0x86, 0x6c, 0x39, 0xef, 0x3a, 0x2b}},
{{0x3e, 0xec, 0x98, 0x84, 0xb4, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xe9, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0xde, 0xea, 0x26, 0x00, 0x04, 0xef, 0xea, 0x2a, 0x46, 0x34, 0x4f, 0xc5, 0x96, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0x7d, 0xd5, 0xd1, 0x89, 0x97, 0xef, 0xa7}},
{{0xb2, 0x9f, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0xcb, 0x96, 0x97, 0x7f, 0xe7, 0x77, 0xd4, 0x89, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0x9e, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0x19, 0xc4, 0x09, 0xb5, 0x10, 0x35, 0x68, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x61, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x48, 0x94}},
{{0x56, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0x12, 0x65, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x98, 0x76, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x14, 0x6d, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x63, 0x66, 0x99, 0x87, 0x4d, 0x3f, 0x90, 0x47, 0x35, 0x50, 0xfe, 0x3f, 0x2c}},
{{0x1d, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x57, 0x5e, 0x22, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x39, 0xff, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0x10, 0xfa, 0x13, 0x85, 0x05, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x63, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x94, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x12, 0xbf, 0xd4, 0x57, 0xca, 0xaa, 0xda}},
{{0xd0, 0xac, 0x50, 0x7a, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xcd, 0x05, 0x93, 0xfa, 0x67, 0xbe, 0x7d, 0x23, 0x13, 0x43, 0x92, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x40, 0x07, 0xe2, 0x53, 0x48, 0x78, 0xd9, 0xb2, 0x42, 0xe1, 0x0d, 0x76, 0x20}},
{{0xf6, 0xc6, 0x84, 0x0b, 0x9c, 0xf1, 0x45, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0xcc, 0xf8, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xe0, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x8e, 0x32, 0xe3, 0x10, 0x99, 0xd5, 0x6f, 0x7f, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xbd, 0x5d, 0xeb, 0x50, 0x94}},
{{0x28, 0x83, 0x1a, 0x33, 0x40, 0x07, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0xdb, 0x87, 0xc1, 0x2e, 0x05, 0x98, 0x0d, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xe9, 0xef, 0x90, 0xf8, 0x3a, 0x48, 0x17, 0xc9, 0xf4, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x32, 0x27, 0xe1, 0x97}},
{{0x87, 0x63, 0x22, 0x73, 0xd6, 0x29, 0xcc, 0xb7, 0xe1, 0xed, 0x1a, 0x76, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x17, 0x60, 0xf3, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x36, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x71, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x6e}},
{{0x5c, 0x7b, 0x29, 0x42, 0x43, 0x47, 0x96, 0x4d, 0x04, 0x27, 0x55, 0x17, 0xc5, 0xae, 0x14, 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xea, 0x27, 0x98, 0xb5, 0x73, 0xfc, 0x94, 0xe6, 0xe4, 0x4a, 0x53, 0x21, 0x60, 0x0c, 0xfb}},
{{0xe6, 0x94, 0x50, 0x42, 0xd7, 0x8b, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xbd, 0x6e, 0xc5, 0x8c, 0x51, 0x1a, 0x9f, 0xe8, 0x59, 0xc0, 0xad, 0x63, 0xfd, 0xe4, 0x94, 0xf5, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x0e, 0x82, 0x32, 0x61, 0x2b, 0xd5}},
{{0x36, 0xd5, 0x69, 0x07, 0xe2, 0xec, 0x74, 0x5d, 0xb6, 0xe5, 0x4f, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0x1b, 0x23, 0x00, 0xab, 0xcb, 0x42, 0x2e, 0x71, 0x2d, 0xa5, 0x88, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0xbb, 0xbe, 0x02, 0xf6}},
{{0x34, 0xdb, 0x6e, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x60, 0x8e, 0x5f, 0x78, 0x36, 0x50, 0x49, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0x2f, 0x52, 0x73, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x84, 0xe4, 0xfd, 0xf9, 0x66, 0x27, 0xbb, 0x16, 0xe3, 0x1e, 0x6b}},
{{0x8e, 0x76, 0x59, 0xfb, 0x45, 0xa3, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x67, 0x4a, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x31, 0xfa, 0xa2, 0x53, 0x8e, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0x42, 0xab, 0x26, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0x91, 0xfa, 0xda, 0x08, 0x94, 0x67, 0xe9}},
{{0x30, 0x06, 0xcf, 0x19, 0x8b, 0x24, 0xf3, 0x1b, 0xb4, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x60, 0x00, 0xab, 0xc7, 0x01, 0xe8, 0x27, 0xcf, 0xbb, 0x5d, 0xf5, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xa9, 0xff, 0x08, 0x02}},
{{0xf5, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0x21, 0x47, 0x2e, 0x37, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x8c, 0x60, 0x83, 0xea, 0x48, 0x03, 0xb8, 0x48, 0x53, 0x89, 0xcc, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x00, 0x2a}},
{{0x37, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x60, 0xeb, 0x3f, 0x94, 0x82, 0xe4, 0x5f, 0x1c, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0xcf, 0x83, 0x4b, 0x75, 0xe6, 0xee, 0xf8, 0xc4, 0x0f, 0x46, 0x1e, 0xa2, 0x7e, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0xd9, 0x47, 0x3d}},
{{0x9f, 0x9d, 0xab, 0x09, 0xc3, 0xf5, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x55, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x65, 0x93, 0x28, 0xa2, 0xdb, 0xc4, 0x54, 0x84, 0x5f, 0x39, 0x6f, 0xfc, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x0b, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xf8, 0xc3}},
{{0x5e, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x5f, 0xdb, 0x98, 0xf2, 0x73, 0xe4, 0xaf, 0xe0, 0x84, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x03, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x67, 0x7b, 0xb5, 0xe2, 0x57, 0x06, 0x40, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x20, 0xa5}},
{{0x86, 0x8b, 0xcf, 0x36, 0x79, 0xcb, 0x6b, 0x50, 0x0b, 0x94, 0x41, 0x8c, 0x0b, 0x89, 0x25, 0xf9, 0x86, 0x55, 0x30, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe4, 0xe4, 0xb2, 0x62, 0x59, 0x18, 0x65, 0x66, 0x6a, 0x45, 0x90}},
{{0xb3, 0xdb, 0x6b, 0xd3, 0x89, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0xd1, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0x96, 0x44, 0xab, 0x21, 0xc8, 0x05, 0x0e, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x38, 0xa5, 0x2f, 0x7c, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xde, 0x75, 0x58, 0xcb, 0x7a}},
{{0x81, 0x19, 0xb3, 0xa0, 0x59, 0xff, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x48, 0x3e, 0x69, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x14, 0x94, 0x47, 0x91, 0x42, 0x88, 0xbb, 0xea, 0xee, 0x34, 0x13, 0xe6, 0xdc, 0xc6, 0xd1, 0xeb}},
{{0x10, 0xfc, 0x58, 0xf3, 0x5f, 0xc7, 0xfe, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x75, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xb5, 0x85, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x7f, 0x97, 0x8c, 0x0c, 0x65, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0x65, 0x46, 0x4b, 0x6d, 0x00, 0x81, 0x9c}},
{{0x5a, 0xcd, 0x94, 0xeb, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x83, 0x79, 0xc1, 0xea, 0x58, 0xa3, 0x43, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0xf9, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6f, 0xe3, 0x55, 0x21, 0xe4, 0x75, 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x6d, 0x88, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xb9}},
{{0x33, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xa2, 0x14, 0xd6, 0xe0, 0xd4, 0x2d, 0x23, 0x00, 0xa7, 0xb4, 0x4b, 0x39, 0x29, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x9b, 0x42, 0x79, 0x74, 0xcd, 0x86, 0x5d, 0xb0, 0x11, 0x05, 0x5a, 0x29, 0x01}},
{{0xcf, 0xc6, 0x57, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xaf, 0xd1, 0x64, 0xa4, 0x94, 0xe6, 0x4e, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0xeb, 0x82, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x7d, 0xa3, 0x55, 0x14, 0x4e, 0x51, 0x24, 0xa3, 0x91, 0xd0, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0x95, 0xea}},
{{0xd5, 0x31, 0x2a, 0x4b, 0x0e, 0xf6, 0x15, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0xac, 0x9e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x39, 0x8b, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xec, 0x90, 0x1c, 0x25, 0x7f, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x8e}},
{{0x55, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x7b, 0x5b, 0x9f, 0x9f, 0xdb, 0xf6, 0xaf, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x6c, 0x8a, 0x74, 0xd7, 0xe4, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x20, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xb5, 0xba, 0x45, 0xc6, 0xfd, 0xe9, 0x3e, 0x33}},
{{0xd5, 0x0a, 0xc7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xc6, 0x56, 0x92, 0x8f, 0x38, 0x42, 0x80, 0x17, 0xfc, 0x7b, 0xa5, 0x02, 0x85, 0x4c, 0x43, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x49, 0x50, 0xe9, 0x6e, 0xcb, 0x40, 0x5d, 0xc3}},
{{0x07, 0x73, 0xe1, 0x8e, 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x44, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x97, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x57, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0x5e, 0xf9, 0xaa, 0x9f, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x12, 0x74, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x26, 0x16, 0x04}},
{{0xe9, 0xaf, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x30, 0xd2, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x5d, 0x1b, 0x41, 0x37, 0xca, 0x61, 0x7e, 0x21, 0x29, 0x7f, 0x2f, 0x0d, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x31, 0xb7, 0xd2, 0xea, 0xd8, 0x71, 0x46, 0x60}},
{{0x7b, 0x12, 0x45, 0x83, 0x09, 0x7f, 0x10, 0x29, 0xa0, 0xc7, 0x41, 0x91, 0xfe, 0x73, 0x78, 0xc9, 0x10, 0x5a, 0xcc, 0x70, 0x66, 0x95, 0xed, 0x14, 0x93, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x03, 0x42, 0x26, 0xa5, 0x7b}},
{{0xec, 0x40, 0x05, 0x7b, 0x99, 0x54, 0x76, 0x65, 0x0b, 0x3d, 0xb9, 0x8e, 0x9d, 0xb7, 0x57, 0x38, 0xa8, 0xcd, 0x2f, 0x94, 0xd8, 0x63, 0xb9, 0x06, 0x15, 0x0c, 0x56, 0xaa, 0xc1, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x6b}},
{{0x01, 0xd9, 0xff, 0x72, 0x9e, 0xfd, 0x39, 0xd8, 0x37, 0x84, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x59, 0xc4, 0xae, 0x81, 0xa6, 0x70, 0x34, 0xcb, 0x53, 0xc9, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x81, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0xe7, 0xfc, 0x33, 0xe5}},
{{0x00, 0xdf, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0x96, 0x32, 0x8c, 0x76, 0x42, 0x45, 0x19, 0xa7, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x76, 0xf9, 0x47, 0xb5, 0x27, 0x67, 0x91, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x73, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0x2e}},
{{0x46, 0x1b, 0x79, 0x9b, 0x4d, 0x9c, 0xee, 0xa8, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xdc, 0xb7, 0x6d, 0x11, 0x15, 0x0d, 0x53, 0x5e, 0x16, 0x39, 0xd1, 0x60, 0x03, 0xc3, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x9d, 0x1f, 0xd1, 0x30, 0x83, 0xa8}},
{{0xee, 0x03, 0x03, 0x94, 0x79, 0xe5, 0x22, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x55, 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x07, 0x9d, 0x34, 0x12, 0xea, 0x18, 0x6a, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xcc, 0x63, 0xe4, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0xcc, 0xe4, 0xfe, 0x3a, 0x6c}},
{{0xa8, 0xcf, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x52, 0x4e, 0x7f, 0x02, 0xb9, 0xf0, 0x45, 0xac, 0xd5, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x1c, 0x37, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xac, 0x20, 0xce, 0xc4, 0x17, 0xa6, 0xdd, 0xb5, 0x74, 0x4e, 0x94}},
{{0x93, 0x2b, 0x79, 0x4b, 0xf8, 0x9c, 0x6e, 0xda, 0xf5, 0xd0, 0x65, 0x0c, 0x7c, 0x4b, 0xad, 0x92, 0x42, 0xb2, 0x56, 0x26, 0xe3, 0x7e, 0xad, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0x5e, 0xc8, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x09, 0xdd, 0x4f}},
{{0x16, 0xb1, 0x0c, 0x77, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xcf, 0xef, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x71, 0x0d, 0x2e, 0x68, 0x44, 0x1e, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xcb, 0x68, 0xe9, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0xd5, 0x33, 0xae, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0x28, 0xbf, 0x57}},
{{0x0f, 0x77, 0xc7, 0x67, 0x43, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x6f, 0x99, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9f, 0x49, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x37, 0xae, 0x54, 0xe2, 0x10, 0x38, 0xac, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xef, 0x17, 0x1a, 0x28, 0xa7, 0xe4}},
{{0xd7, 0xe5, 0x74, 0xb7, 0xb9, 0x52, 0xf2, 0x93, 0xe8, 0x0d, 0xde, 0x90, 0x5e, 0xb5, 0x09, 0x37, 0x3f, 0x3f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x22, 0x08, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0xe9, 0x24, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x20, 0xca}},
{{0x45, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x8c, 0x38, 0x1e, 0x3d, 0xa6, 0x75, 0x56, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xba, 0x23, 0xf8, 0x3b, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0x34, 0xab, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x97, 0x5e, 0xf9, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x0c, 0xb9}},
{{0xb2, 0x46, 0x12, 0xe4, 0x54, 0x60, 0x7e, 0xb1, 0xab, 0xa4, 0x47, 0xf8, 0x16, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0x55, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x24, 0x7f, 0xb7, 0xc1, 0xf5, 0x03, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x71, 0x77, 0xf0, 0xdd}},
{{0x7e, 0x20, 0x88, 0x61, 0x85, 0x6d, 0xa4, 0x2c, 0x8b, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0x75, 0x67, 0xf8, 0x12, 0x13, 0x62, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x24, 0x96, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0x90, 0x17, 0xcf, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xce}},
{{0x5b, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xff, 0x6a, 0xd1, 0x10, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x7a, 0x05, 0x56, 0x01, 0xea, 0x02, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x0f, 0x41, 0x05, 0x0f, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x3c, 0x95, 0xdc, 0xcb, 0xd3, 0x08, 0x7b, 0xe0}},
{{0x74, 0x6d, 0x1d, 0xcc, 0xfe, 0xd2, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xc5, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x32, 0x43, 0x75, 0xfb, 0xd5, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0x89, 0x31, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x1d, 0x43, 0xab}},
{{0xcb, 0x98, 0x11, 0x0d, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0xb9, 0x7d, 0x22, 0xfe, 0xad, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x30, 0xc5, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0x50, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0xb3, 0x53, 0x28, 0xd2, 0x6b, 0x88, 0xdb, 0x19, 0xae}},
{{0x60, 0xb6, 0x26, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xb5, 0x5f, 0x27, 0xd7, 0x67, 0x6c, 0x40, 0x95, 0xea, 0xba, 0xbc, 0x7a, 0x2c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x26, 0x24, 0xb4, 0x72, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x64, 0xf9, 0x6b, 0x8c, 0xfc, 0x0e}},
{{0xe5, 0xb5, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x27, 0x46, 0x8d, 0xf7, 0x18, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x81, 0x97, 0xef, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xb0, 0xaa, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0xe4, 0xfe, 0x93, 0xad, 0x62, 0xd8, 0x03, 0x98, 0x31, 0x04}},
{{0x05, 0x65, 0x41, 0xae, 0x5d, 0xa9, 0x96, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xb0, 0xa5, 0xe8, 0x95, 0xe5, 0xc5, 0xba, 0x15, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x62, 0xdd, 0x56, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xad, 0x0f, 0xfd, 0x41, 0x92, 0x31, 0x99}},
{{0xf8, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0xf3, 0xeb, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x38, 0xb2, 0x47, 0xb7, 0x11, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0x96, 0x0f, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0xa2, 0xf9, 0x01, 0x36, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x29, 0xb8, 0x88}}};
//Debug printing for the above types
//Actually use DP(value) and #define DBG
void dp(key a);
void dp(bool a);
void dp(const char * a, int l);
void dp(keyV a);
void dp(keyM a);
void dp(xmr_amount vali);
void dp(int vali);
void dp(bits amountb);
void dp(const char * st);
//various conversions
//uint long long to 32 byte key
void d2h(key & amounth, xmr_amount val);
key d2h(xmr_amount val);
//uint long long to int[64]
void d2b(bits amountb, xmr_amount val);
//32 byte key to uint long long
// if the key holds a value > 2^64
// then the value in the first 8 bytes is returned
xmr_amount h2d(const key &test);
//32 byte key to int[64]
void h2b(bits amountb2, const key & test);
//int[64] to 32 byte key
void b2h(key & amountdh, bits amountb2);
//int[64] to uint long long
xmr_amount b2d(bits amountb);
bool is_rct_simple(int type);
bool is_rct_bulletproof(int type);
bool is_rct_borromean(int type);
static inline const rct::key &pk2rct(const crypto::public_key &pk) { return (const rct::key&)pk; }
static inline const rct::key &sk2rct(const crypto::secret_key &sk) { return (const rct::key&)sk; }
static inline const rct::key &ki2rct(const crypto::key_image &ki) { return (const rct::key&)ki; }
static inline const rct::key &hash2rct(const crypto::hash &h) { return (const rct::key&)h; }
static inline const crypto::public_key &rct2pk(const rct::key &k) { return (const crypto::public_key&)k; }
static inline const crypto::secret_key &rct2sk(const rct::key &k) { return (const crypto::secret_key&)k; }
static inline const crypto::key_image &rct2ki(const rct::key &k) { return (const crypto::key_image&)k; }
static inline const crypto::hash &rct2hash(const rct::key &k) { return (const crypto::hash&)k; }
static inline bool operator==(const rct::key &k0, const crypto::public_key &k1) { return !crypto_verify_32(k0.bytes, (const unsigned char*)&k1); }
static inline bool operator!=(const rct::key &k0, const crypto::public_key &k1) { return crypto_verify_32(k0.bytes, (const unsigned char*)&k1); }
2016-06-10 19:15:01 +00:00
}
namespace cryptonote {
static inline bool operator==(const crypto::public_key &k0, const rct::key &k1) { return !crypto_verify_32((const unsigned char*)&k0, k1.bytes); }
static inline bool operator!=(const crypto::public_key &k0, const rct::key &k1) { return crypto_verify_32((const unsigned char*)&k0, k1.bytes); }
static inline bool operator==(const crypto::secret_key &k0, const rct::key &k1) { return !crypto_verify_32((const unsigned char*)&k0, k1.bytes); }
static inline bool operator!=(const crypto::secret_key &k0, const rct::key &k1) { return crypto_verify_32((const unsigned char*)&k0, k1.bytes); }
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
namespace rct {
inline std::ostream &operator <<(std::ostream &o, const rct::key &v) {
epee::to_hex::formatted(o, epee::as_byte_span(v)); return o;
}
2017-02-19 02:42:10 +00:00
}
2017-08-13 14:29:31 +00:00
namespace std
{
template<> struct hash<rct::key> { std::size_t operator()(const rct::key &k) const { return reinterpret_cast<const std::size_t&>(k); } };
}
BLOB_SERIALIZER(rct::key);
BLOB_SERIALIZER(rct::key64);
BLOB_SERIALIZER(rct::ctkey);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
BLOB_SERIALIZER(rct::multisig_kLRki);
2016-11-17 23:17:21 +00:00
BLOB_SERIALIZER(rct::boroSig);
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::key, "rct::key");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::key64, "rct::key64");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::keyV, "rct::keyV");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::keyM, "rct::keyM");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::ctkey, "rct::ctkey");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::ctkeyV, "rct::ctkeyV");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::ctkeyM, "rct::ctkeyM");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::ecdhTuple, "rct::ecdhTuple");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::mgSig, "rct::mgSig");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::rangeSig, "rct::rangeSig");
2016-11-17 23:17:21 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::boroSig, "rct::boroSig");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::rctSig, "rct::rctSig");
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct::bulletproof");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, "rct::multisig_kLRki");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::multisig_out, "rct::multisig_out");
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key, 0x90);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key64, 0x91);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::keyV, 0x92);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::keyM, 0x93);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::ctkey, 0x94);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::ctkeyV, 0x95);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::ctkeyM, 0x96);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::ecdhTuple, 0x97);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::mgSig, 0x98);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::rangeSig, 0x99);
2016-11-17 23:17:21 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::boroSig, 0x9a);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::rctSig, 0x9b);
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::Bulletproof, 0x9c);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 21:34:26 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, 0x9d);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::multisig_out, 0x9e);
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key, "rct_key");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key64, "rct_key64");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::keyV, "rct_keyV");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::keyM, "rct_keyM");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::ctkey, "rct_ctkey");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::ctkeyV, "rct_ctkeyV");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::ctkeyM, "rct_ctkeyM");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::ecdhTuple, "rct_ecdhTuple");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::mgSig, "rct_mgSig");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::rangeSig, "rct_rangeSig");
2016-11-17 23:17:21 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::boroSig, "rct_boroSig");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::rctSig, "rct_rctSig");
2017-12-02 08:32:39 +00:00
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct_bulletproof");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, "rct_multisig_kLR");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::multisig_out, "rct_multisig_out");
#endif /* RCTTYPES_H */