3 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
nigig-ci	25f32f7870	test(sms): build a real test suite (Phase G) ... 50 tests -> 102, and the two that were there at the start of this work are deleted. Where this started: robius-sms had ZERO tests, and nigig-sms had two -- bulk_sub_tab_default_is_contacts and bulk_sub_tab_variants_distinct. Both asserted a derived Default and a derived PartialEq. Neither mentioned SMS. Neither could fail short of the compiler breaking. That is the defect that produced every other defect in this plan: nothing could prove a change was safe, so nothing was ever deleted and every bug survived contact with review. Property tests (proptest, new dev-dependency) Seven over truncate_preview, format_timestamp, badge_text, and five more over segment_count, the rate limiter and ScheduleRequest. These are the ones that matter, because the hand-written cases in this repo all encode a bug someone had ALREADY found. proptest searches the space instead. I verified that by reinstating the original byte-slicing truncate_preview and confirming prop_truncate_preview_survives_mixed_scripts and prop_truncate_preview_respects_the_char_limit both fail against it -- they would have caught A3 before it shipped. prop_rate_limiter_respects_capacity models the window independently and asserts the invariant across random clock sequences, rather than re-implementing the limiter's own arithmetic in the assertion. Integration tests (2 new files, public API only) robius-sms/tests/sms_pipeline.rs and nigig-core/tests/sms_store.rs go through the public surface the application actually uses. The unit tests inside src/ can see private helpers; these cannot, which is the point -- they catch a refactor that keeps every unit test green while breaking the caller-visible contract. Two of them are privacy canaries. e1_message_bodies_are_never_persisted and e1_no_body_text_reaches_the_serialised_store fail if anyone removes #[serde(skip)] from OfflineSmsMessage.body. Verified by removing it: both fail, the other six pass. Nothing else in the tree would have noticed the inbox silently going back to plaintext on disk. Named regression tests One per defect, named for it -- c1_*, d1_*, d3_*, e1_*, e7_*, a4_*, c3_*, c7_* -- so a future reader goes from a failing test straight to the bug it guards rather than to a git archaeology session. New coverage for logic that had none - build_timeline_items / build_filtered_timeline_items: date-divider placement and the message indices the draw loop uses to index conv_data.messages. An off-by-one there renders the wrong body in the wrong bubble; it had no test at all. - kind_to_offline / kind_from_offline round-trip: the only thing stopping a cached Sent message reappearing as Inbox after a restart, which would flip the bubble to the wrong side of the screen. - normalize_number: what C1 groups on, across five formatting variants plus short codes and alphanumeric senders. MessageKind::from_android_type / to_android_type were hoisted out of sys/android/inbox.rs onto the type, the same way ScheduleRequest::validate was in A4, so the provider mapping is testable off-device. An unrecognised TYPE value is preserved verbatim in Unknown rather than defaulted, and there is a property test asserting the round trip is total over every i32. CI: a test-count FLOOR at 100. A floor rather than a ratchet -- unlike the clippy count, there is no reason to ever want this number to fall. Deliberately NOT faked: the JNI cursor loop, the keystore round-trip and broadcast delivery still need an emulator. A mock returning what I expect would test my expectations, not Android. Those remain called out in the Phase A and E commit messages. Verified: 11/11 checks. 48 robius-sms + 46 nigig-sms + 8 sms_store = 102. clippy -D warnings clean on host and aarch64-linux-android; nigig-sms ratchet holds at 32 (my first draft added an orphaned `use super::*`, caught by the ratchet and removed rather than baselined).	2026-08-02 08:43:16 +00:00
nigig-ci	a38c41c00a	security(sms): stop persisting message bodies, throttle sends (Phase E) ... E1 -- the inbox was written to disk in plaintext. offline_store wrote every SMS body to app_data_dir/offline_store/sms_messages.json as pretty-printed JSON. SMS is the transport for OTPs, banking codes and M-Pesa confirmations, so that file was the user's complete authentication history sitting in app-private storage -- readable by anything running as the same UID, and included in backups. This repository already knew the answer. THREAT_MODEL.md T-I2 records "Raw SMS persisted to PSV file" as fixed in Phase 0, with raw_message omitted from save_to_disk() so it "lives in memory only". The SMS app then re-introduced the same defect at larger scale: the entire inbox rather than just M-Pesa messages, and with no retention limit until D6. OfflineSmsMessage.body is now #[serde(skip)]. Dropping the field rather than encrypting it is the deliberate choice: every consumer already reads the device provider FIRST and writes the cache second (nigig-sms fetch_from_device, and the mpesa and pay transaction pages), so the provider is the system of record and no body needs to survive a restart. Encryption would keep the plaintext reachable to anything holding the key. Not writing it removes the asset. Two consequences handled: sms_key() no longer hashes the body, since a reloaded row has an empty one and dedupe would otherwise never match its own cached entry and grow a duplicate per refresh; and the cached first paint shows a neutral placeholder rather than a blank preview for the instant before the provider read lands. E9 -- the Linux backend's dependencies were pure cost. robius-sms declared polkit =0.17.0 and gio =0.17.0 for target_os = "linux". sys/linux.rs references neither: all twelve functions return Err(PermanentlyUnavailable). Those two crates dragged in glib and proc-macro-error and were the origin of RUSTSEC-2024-0370 and RUSTSEC-2024-0429 for every consumer of this crate. Deleting the block removes 340 lines from Cargo.lock. polkit, gio, glib and proc-macro-error no longer appear in the workspace at all, which also closes the LGPL-2.1 linkage question outright rather than routing around it as Phase B did for nigig-build alone. E4 -- ROBIUS_SMS_BOOT_LIB was a code-injection vector. build.rs interpolated that environment variable straight into a Java string literal, which is then compiled, dexed and loaded at runtime with the app's full permissions. A value containing a quote closes the literal and injects arbitrary Java that runs on the device at boot. Build-time environment is not trusted input. Now validated against [A-Za-z0-9_]+ and the build fails loudly otherwise. Tested both ways: an exec payload is rejected, a legitimate name builds. E5 -- undefined behaviour in the dex loader. new_direct_byte_buffer was handed RECEIVER_BYTECODE.as_ptr() as *mut u8 -- a &'static [u8] in .rodata cast to a mutable pointer, when the API is documented as taking writable memory and InMemoryDexClassLoader may write through it. Now copies into an owned allocation and leaks it, which is correct rather than lazy: the buffer backs a ClassLoader cached in a OnceLock for the process lifetime. E6 -- two bindings for one native method. rustRestoreSchedules was both exported #[no_mangle] and registered dynamically via register_native_methods. Which one won was unspecified. Kept the dynamic one, because the class is loaded from an in-memory dex and is not on the JVM's search path, so symbol binding is not guaranteed to find it. E8 -- no send rate limiting. Nothing capped send rate, and the bulk UI exists to blast a scraped directory. Android's practical throttle is ~30 messages per 30 minutes per app, past which sends are silently dropped -- so an unthrottled batch both overspends and fails opaquely. Adds SendRateLimiter, a pure token bucket taking an explicit clock so it is unit-testable without sleeping, wired into the bulk sender. A 200-recipient blast now stops at 30 and says why. E10 -- robius-sms carried no license field, so cargo-deny needed a [[licenses.clarify]] override asserting one. Stated in the manifest; override removed. E2 was already satisfied by D6 (retention capped at 5,000). E7/E11 are documented rather than fixed, which is the honest status: delivery confirmation needs real PendingIntents plumbed through (A8 documents that Ok != delivered), and sender validation cannot be solved client-side. Both are now rows in THREAT_MODEL.md instead of findings in a markdown report -- along with T-I2b for E1 and T-I4 for E3, which is NOT done: scheduled message bodies are still plaintext in SharedPreferences. CI: adds a gate asserting OfflineSmsMessage.body keeps #[serde(skip)]. Removing that attribute silently resumes writing plaintext and nothing else would fail. Negative-tested. deny-nigig-build.toml drops to 2 exemptions (from 5 before Phase B). Tests: robius-sms 21 -> 25. Verified: 12/12 CI jobs, clippy -D warnings clean on host and aarch64-linux-android, cargo deny "advisories ok, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok", clippy ratchet holds at 49.	2026-08-01 04:58:46 +00:00
andodeki	e9616c3288	added missing crates	2026-07-26 21:22:21 +03:00