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Author SHA1 Message Date
Russ Magee
02e379e50d Updated README.md for v0.9.3 wrt. default accepted algs 2021-11-15 20:57:29 -08:00
Russ Magee
9c844938a9 Version bump -> v0.9.3 2021-11-15 20:46:49 -08:00
Russ Magee
20113653f7 xsd.initrc require admin to set defaults 2021-11-15 20:35:20 -08:00
Russ Magee
ca4335df9e Fixed typo in example xsd.initrc 2021-11-15 19:25:30 -08:00
Russ Magee
6965ecf78e Merge branch 'master' of https://gogs.blitter.com/RLabs/xs 2021-11-15 18:33:02 -08:00
Russ Magee
d837bd2583 xsd.initrc fix; help improvements 2021-11-15 18:32:42 -08:00
Russ Magee
12b7e525bf Help improvements 2021-11-15 17:57:01 -08:00
5 changed files with 35 additions and 10 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
VERSION := 0.9.3-pre
VERSION := 0.9.3
.PHONY: lint vis clean common client server passwd subpkgs install uninstall reinstall
## Tag version of binaries with build info wrt.

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@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ An interesting question. See [this write-up for a discussion](https://paragonie.
xs operates via the philosophy that **it is the server admin's prerogitive to configure local policy wrt. allowed cryptographic primitives**. The connection protocol makes no allowance for any sort of 'downgrades' or algo substitution during negotiation; there is no 'fallback' mode or two-way negotiation of what primitives to use, which would open the possibility of downgrade attacks. Unlike `ssh`, the server does not offer to clients a list of supported algorithms; the client can only offer a single configuration to the server, which it simply accepts or rejects without comment to the client.
In all releases to date, absent a specific whitelist of algs to allow, the server allows 'all' combinations of the above cryptographic primitives to be proposed by clients (but again, **only one** combination is proposed by the client in a single connect attempt). If the admin wishes to restrict the accepted algorithms now or at any future time, they may use the `-aK`, `-aC` and `-aH` options when launching the server to define a whitelist which excludes certain primitives. In future releases the default may be changed to accept *no* algs and such a whitelist shall be required. This will have no effect on the connection protocol itself.
In all releases prior to v0.9.3, absent a specific whitelist of algs to allow, the server allows 'all' combinations of the above cryptographic primitives to be proposed by clients (but again, **only one** combination is proposed by the client in a single connect attempt). If the admin wishes to restrict the accepted algorithms now or at any future time, they may use the `-aK`, `-aC` and `-aH` options when launching the server to define a whitelist which excludes certain primitives.
As of release v0.9.3, the default when supplying no explicit KEX, cipher or HMAC algorithms to `xsd` results in *no* algs being accepted; so the admin must decide on a specific whitelist of algorithms.
***

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@ -710,9 +710,30 @@ func main() {
flag.BoolVar(&vopt, "v", false, "show version")
flag.BoolVar(&dbg, "d", false, "debug logging")
flag.StringVar(&cipherAlg, "c", "C_AES_256", "session `cipher` [C_AES_256 | C_TWOFISH_128 | C_BLOWFISH_64 | C_CRYPTMT1 | C_CHACHA20_12 | C_HOPSCOTCH]")
flag.StringVar(&hmacAlg, "m", "H_SHA256", "session `HMAC` [H_SHA256 | H_SHA512]")
flag.StringVar(&kexAlg, "k", "KEX_HERRADURA512", "KEx `alg` [KEX_HERRADURA{256/512/1024/2048} | KEX_KYBER{512/768/1024} | KEX_NEWHOPE | KEX_NEWHOPE_SIMPLE | KEX_FRODOKEM_{1344|976}{AES|SHAKE}]")
flag.StringVar(&cipherAlg, "c", "C_AES_256", "session `cipher`"+`
C_AES_256
C_TWOFISH_128
C_BLOWFISH_64
C_CRYPTMT1
C_HOPSCOTCH
C_CHACHA20_12`)
flag.StringVar(&hmacAlg, "m", "H_SHA256", "session `HMAC`"+`
H_SHA256
H_SHA512`)
flag.StringVar(&kexAlg, "k", "KEX_HERRADURA512", "KEx `alg`"+`
KEX_HERRADURA256
KEX_HERRADURA512
KEX_HERRADURA1024
KEX_HERRADURA2048
KEX_KYBER512
KEX_KYBER768
KEX_KYBER1024
KEX_NEWHOPE
KEX_NEWHOPE_SIMPLE
KEX_FRODOKEM_1344AES
KEX_FRODOKEM_1344SHAKE
KEX_FRODOKEM_976AES
KEX_FRODOKEM_976SHAKE`)
flag.StringVar(&kcpMode, "K", "unused", "KCP `alg`, one of [KCP_NONE | KCP_AES | KCP_BLOWFISH | KCP_CAST5 | KCP_SM4 | KCP_SALSA20 | KCP_SIMPLEXOR | KCP_TEA | KCP_3DES | KCP_TWOFISH | KCP_XTEA] to use KCP (github.com/xtaci/kcp-go) reliable UDP instead of TCP")
flag.UintVar(&port, "p", 2000, "``port")
//flag.StringVar(&authCookie, "a", "", "auth cookie")

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@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ XSD_USER=root
XSD_HOME=/var/run
INST_PREFIX=/usr/local
COMMAND=$INST_PREFIX/sbin/xsd
ARGS="-L"
#ARGS="-L -aK KEX_all -aC C_all -aH H_all"
echo "SET ARGS in this script to define allow KEX, cipher and hmac algs"
exit 1
depend() {
need net
@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ start() {
-d ${XSD_HOME} \
--make-pidfile --pidfile ${XSD_PIDFILE} \
--start --quiet --background \
--exec "${COMMAND}" -- "${ARGS}"
--exec "${COMMAND}" -- ${ARGS}
eend $?
}

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@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ func main() {
flag.BoolVar(&useSystemPasswd, "s", true, "use system shadow passwds")
flag.BoolVar(&dbg, "d", false, "debug logging")
flag.Var(&aKEXAlgs, "aK", `Allowed KEX algs (eg. '-aK KEXAlgA -aK KEXAlgB ...') (default: none)
flag.Var(&aKEXAlgs, "aK", "Allowed KEX `alg`s (eg. '-aK KEXAlgA -aK KEXAlgB ...')" + `
KEX_all
KEX_HERRADURA256
KEX_HERRADURA512
@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ func main() {
KEX_FRODOKEM_1344SHAKE
KEX_FRODOKEM_976AES
KEX_FRODOKEM_976SHAKE`)
flag.Var(&aCipherAlgs, "aC", `Allowed ciphers (eg. '-aC CAlgA -aC CAlgB ...') (default: none)
flag.Var(&aCipherAlgs, "aC", "Allowed `cipher`s (eg. '-aC CAlgA -aC CAlgB ...')" + `
C_all
C_AES_256
C_TWOFISH_128
@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ func main() {
C_CRYPTMT1
C_HOPSCOTCH
C_CHACHA20_12`)
flag.Var(&aHMACAlgs, "aH", `Allowed HMACs (eg. '-aH HMACAlgA -aH HMACAlgB ...') (default: none)
flag.Var(&aHMACAlgs, "aH", "Allowed `HMAC`s (eg. '-aH HMACAlgA -aH HMACAlgB ...')" + `
H_all
H_SHA256
H_SHA512`)