bcv-vf/src/main/java/the/bytecode/club/bytecodeviewer/util/SecurityMan.java

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package the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.util;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileDescriptor;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.security.Permission;
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import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.BytecodeViewer;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.Configuration;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.Constants;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.compilers.impl.JavaCompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.compilers.impl.KrakatauAssembler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.CFRDecompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.FernFlowerDecompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.JDGUIDecompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.KrakatauDecompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.KrakatauDisassembler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.decompilers.impl.ProcyonDecompiler;
import the.bytecode.club.bytecodeviewer.resources.ExternalResources;
/***************************************************************************
* Bytecode Viewer (BCV) - Java & Android Reverse Engineering Suite *
* Copyright (C) 2014 Kalen 'Konloch' Kinloch - http://bytecodeviewer.com *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, *
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of *
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the *
* GNU General Public License for more details. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
***************************************************************************/
/**
* An awesome security manager.
*
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* @author Konloch
*/
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public class SecurityMan extends SecurityManager
{
private final AtomicInteger silentExec = new AtomicInteger(1);
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private boolean printing = false;
private boolean printingPackage = false;
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public void silenceExec(boolean b) {
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silentExec.addAndGet(b ? 1 : -1);
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}
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public void setPrinting(boolean printing)
{
this.printing = printing;
}
public void setPrintingPackage(boolean printingPackage)
{
this.printingPackage = printingPackage;
}
/**
* Attempts to secure untrusted code
*
* When paired with checkWrite it should prevent most escapes
* JNI is still possible so make sure to block checkLink as well //TODO for BCV
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*
* Rewritten on 07/19/2021
*
* @author Konloch
*/
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@Override
public void checkExec(String cmd)
{
//incoming command must contain the following or it will be automatically denied
String[] execWhitelist =
{
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"attrib",
"python",
"pypy",
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"java",
"brut_util",
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};
//the goal is to make this true
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boolean allow = false;
//while keeping this false
boolean blocked = false;
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//normalize all command paths
final String normalizedPath;
try
{
normalizedPath = new File(cmd.toLowerCase()).getCanonicalPath();
}
catch (IOException e)
{
throw new SecurityException(e);
}
//don't trust .jar file extensions being executed
if(normalizedPath.endsWith(".jar"))
blocked = true;
//don't trust .js file extensions being executed
else if(normalizedPath.endsWith(".js"))
blocked = true;
//block anything executing in system temp
else if(normalizedPath.startsWith(Constants.systemTempDirectory.toLowerCase()))
blocked = true;
//can only write into BCV dir, so anything executing from here has probably been dropped
try
{
if(normalizedPath.startsWith(Constants.BCVDir.getCanonicalPath().toLowerCase()))
blocked = true;
}
catch (IOException e)
{
throw new SecurityException(e);
}
//filter exec whitelist
for (String whiteList : execWhitelist)
{
if (normalizedPath.contains(whiteList))
{
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allow = true;
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break;
}
}
//filter class whitelist
boolean validClassCall = false;
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//JDK-8
if(canClassExecute(Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()[3].getClassName()))
validClassCall = true;
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//JDK-15
else if(canClassExecute(Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()[4].getClassName()))
validClassCall = true;
//JDK-8
else if(canClassExecute(Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()[6].getClassName()))
validClassCall = true;
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//JDK-15
else if(canClassExecute(Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()[7].getClassName()))
validClassCall = true;
else
{
int index = 0;
for (StackTraceElement stackTraceElements : Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace())
{
System.out.println(index++ + ":" + stackTraceElements.getClassName());
}
}
//log exec if allowed
if (allow && validClassCall && !blocked)
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{
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if(silentExec.get() >= 1)
System.err.println("Allowing exec: " + cmd);
} //throw exception stopping execution
else throw new SecurityException("BCV is awesome! Blocking exec: " + cmd);
}
/**
* Class Whitelist goes here
*/
private boolean canClassExecute(String fullyQualifiedClassName)
{
return fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(KrakatauDecompiler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(KrakatauDisassembler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(CFRDecompiler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(ProcyonDecompiler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(FernFlowerDecompiler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(JDGUIDecompiler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(KrakatauAssembler.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(ExternalResources.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(Enjarify.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(APKTool.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(BytecodeViewer.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(Constants.class.getCanonicalName()) ||
fullyQualifiedClassName.equals(JavaCompiler.class.getCanonicalName());
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}
@Override
public void checkListen(int port) {
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throw new SecurityException("BCV is awesome, blocking port " + port + " from listening");
}
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@Override
public void checkPermission(Permission perm) { //expand eventually
}
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@Override
public void checkPermission(Permission perm, Object context) {//expand eventually
}
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@Override
public void checkAccess(Thread t) {
}
@Override
public void checkAccept(String host, int port) {
}
@Override
public void checkAccess(ThreadGroup g) {
}
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@SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
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public void checkAwtEventQueueAccess() {
}
@Override
public void checkConnect(String host, int port) {
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if(printing)
System.out.println("Connecting to: " + host + ":" + port);
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}
@Override
public void checkConnect(String host, int port, Object context) {
}
@Override
public void checkCreateClassLoader() {
}
@Override
public void checkDelete(String file) {
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if(printing)
System.out.println("Deleting: " + file);
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}
@Override
public void checkExit(int status) {
if (!Configuration.canExit) {
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throw new SecurityException("BCV is awesome, blocking System.exit(" + status + ");");
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}
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}
@Override
public void checkLink(String lib) {
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if(printing)
System.out.println("Linking: " + lib);
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}
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@SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
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public void checkMemberAccess(Class<?> clazz, int which) {
}
@Override
public void checkMulticast(InetAddress maddr) {
}
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@SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
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public void checkMulticast(InetAddress maddr, byte ttl) {
}
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public void checkPackageAccess(String pkg) {
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if(printingPackage)
System.out.println("Accessing: " + pkg);
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}
@Override
public void checkPackageDefinition(String pkg) {
}
@Override
public void checkPrintJobAccess() {
}
@Override
public void checkPropertiesAccess() {
}
@Override
public void checkPropertyAccess(String key) {
}
@Override
public void checkRead(FileDescriptor fd) {
}
@Override
public void checkRead(String file) {
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if(printing)
System.out.println("Reading: " + file);
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}
@Override
public void checkRead(String file, Object context) {
}
@Override
public void checkSecurityAccess(String target) {
}
@Override
public void checkSetFactory() {
}
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@SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
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public void checkSystemClipboardAccess() {
}
@Override
public void checkWrite(FileDescriptor fd) {
}
@Override
public void checkWrite(String file) {
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if(printing)
System.out.println("Writing: " + file);
try
{
//can only export as the following extensions
if(file.endsWith(".zip") || file.endsWith(".jar") || file.endsWith(".apk")
|| file.endsWith(".dex") || file.endsWith(".class") || file.endsWith("js")
|| file.endsWith(".java") || file.endsWith(".gy") || file.endsWith(".bcv")
|| file.endsWith(".json") || file.endsWith(".txt") || file.endsWith(".log"))
return;
//can only write into BCV dir
if(file.startsWith(Constants.BCVDir.getCanonicalPath()))
return;
//can only write into system temp
if(file.startsWith(Constants.systemTempDirectory))
return;
}
catch (IOException e)
{
throw new SecurityException(e);
}
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throw new SecurityException("BCV is awesome, blocking write(" + file + ");");
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}
}